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THE RIGHT NOT TO KEEP OR BEAR ARMS 
Joseph Blocher* 
Sometimes a constitutional right to do a particular thing is accompanied by 
a right not to do that thing. The First Amendment, for example, guarantees both 
the right to speak and the right not to speak. This Article asks whether the Second 
Amendment should likewise be read to encompass both the right to keep or bear 
arms for self-defense and the inverse right to protect oneself by avoiding arms, 
and what practical implications, if any, the latter right would have. The Article 
concludes—albeit with some important qualifications—that a right not to keep or 
bear arms is implied by what the Supreme Court has called the “core” and “cen-
tral component” of the Second Amendment: self-defense, especially in the home. 
Recognizing such a right might call into question the constitutionality of the 
growing number of “anti-gun control” laws that make it difficult or illegal for 
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INTRODUCTION 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court held that the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms for purposes 
of self-defense.2 In doing so, the Court rejected the idea that the amendment’s 
function is to protect the state militias from disarmament by the federal gov-
ernment, finding instead that the original public understanding of the Second 
Amendment gives individuals the right to keep and bear arms disconnected 
from military service, and that it “elevates above all other interests the right of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”3 
The Court went on to conclude that “keeping” a gun means having it in one’s 
constructive possession—in the home, for example—and that “bearing” a gun 
means carrying it on one’s person.4 These actions are constitutionally protected 
because they advance the “central component” or “core lawful purpose” of the 
Second Amendment: freedom of self-defense,5 particularly in the home.6  
 
 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 598-600; see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second 
Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2010) 
(concluding that Heller “constitutionalizes self-defense”); Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Re-
strictions at the Margins of Heller and the Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault 
Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1285 (2009) (“Heller es-
tablished that citizens have a constitutional right to possess guns that are in common use for 
ordinary purposes like self-defense.”); Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms Af-
ter District of Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2009) (“Finally, at the heart 
of Heller is the purpose of self-defense against criminal violence, which Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s opinion for the Court ringingly endorses as ‘the core lawful purpose’ served by the 
Second Amendment right to arms.” (footnote omitted)); Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Original-
ism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1413 (2009) (“The ma-
jority . . . read the Second Amendment to preserve the militia by codifying the common law 
right of self-defense, and declared that the Amendment ‘elevates above all other interests the 
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”). 
 3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 630 (emphasis omitted); see also McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (“Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many 
legal systems from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual 
self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right.” (footnote omit-
ted)); infra Part I.B. 
For the purposes of this Article I take the individual self-defense rationale as a given. 
Elsewhere I have questioned its coherence as stated in Heller. See Joseph Blocher, Categori-
calism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 
426-29 (2009). 
 6. The majority noted that “the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute” in one’s home, and emphasized “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
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But what if a person believes that the best way to defend himself against 
violence in his home is to keep guns out of it? After all, despite the undoubted 
importance of the right to self-defense and the political popularity of the Su-
preme Court’s “individual rights” reading of the Second Amendment,7 a major-
ity of Americans choose not to keep guns in their homes.8 Many if not most 
make that decision for personal safety reasons,9 and even among gun owners, 
only a minority say that their primary motivation for having a gun is self-
protection against crime.10 Empirical data regarding self-defense and gun own-
ership are notoriously contested,11 and often unpersuasive,12 so it may be im-
 
arms in defense of hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 635; see also Darrell A.H. 
Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1278, 1282 (2009) (arguing that Heller, read alongside other doctrinal sources, establishes 
that “[t]he individual right to keep and bear arms should extend no further than the front 
porch”). 
 7. Nearly three in four Americans believe that the Second Amendment protects an 
“individual” (i.e., non-militia-related) right to bear arms. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Be-
lieves Americans Have Right to Own Guns: Nearly Three in Four Say Second Amendment 
Guarantees This Right, GALLUP (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/     
public-believes-americans-right-own-guns.aspx. 
 8. Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a So-
cial Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1045 (2009) (“[A]bout 75 percent of all 
adults do not own any guns.”).  
 9. PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE 
OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 3 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief, NCJ 165476, 
1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf (“In 1994, about two-thirds of 
gunless adults were actively opposed to having guns in their homes because they viewed 
guns as dangerous, ‘immoral,’ or otherwise objectionable.”).  
 10. Cook et al., supra note 8, at 1047 (“Less than 50 percent of gun owners say that 
their primary motivation for having a gun is self-protection against crime.”). 
 11. Compare JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME 
AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS 165 (3d ed. 2010) (arguing that although “a few people do and 
will use permitted concealed handguns improperly, . . . the gains completely overwhelm 
these concerns”), and Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Preva-
lence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 151-52 
(1995) (concluding that victims who resist with a gun or other weapon are less likely to lose 
their property in robberies and burglaries and less likely to be injured compared to those that 
do not resist or resist without a weapon), with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting 
Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202 (2003) 
(“While we do not want to overstate the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the extremely variable results emerging from the statistical analysis, if anything, there is 
stronger evidence for the conclusion that these [shall-issue] laws increase crime than there is 
for the conclusion that they decrease it.”), and Philip J. Cook, The Technology of Personal 
Violence, 14 CRIME & JUST. 1, 4-5 (1991) (pointing out that although guns are “surely” useful 
in self-defense, “[o]ne survey found that as many handgun owners reported being involved 
in a gun accident as reported using the gun in self-defense”). 
 12. Arguably, this is because people simply do not care about the numbers—their 
views on guns are shaped by cultural frameworks rather than statistics. See MARK V. 
TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS, at 
xiv (2007); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1293-94 (2003). 
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possible to say whether avoiding guns is, statistically speaking, the “right” safe-
ty decision. But since Heller entrusts that decision to the individual, the statis-
tics should be largely irrelevant as a constitutional matter.13 A person who be-
lieves her home to be safer without a gun is attempting to protect herself from a 
risk of future violence, just like a person who chooses to keep a handgun on her 
bedside table. If self-defense is the “core” of the Second Amendment, why 
should only one of these decisions be constitutionally protected? Shouldn’t the 
interests giving rise to the affirmative right also protect a person’s freedom not 
to exercise it? 
The central idea explored in this Article is that the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee of an individual right to keep or bear arms in self-defense should in-
clude the freedom not to keep or bear them at all. Though such a “negative” 
Second Amendment self-defense right has never been recognized, nor even 
thoroughly discussed,14 rights not to engage in constitutionally protected activi-
ties are well established in other areas of law.15 This is especially but not uni-
quely true in First Amendment doctrine, which in turn has often been used as a 
guidepost for the Second Amendment.16 Indeed, the freedom not to speak has 
famously been called a “fixed star in our constitutional constellation,”17 pre-
cisely because it serves the same First Amendment values as speech itself: in-
dividual autonomy, the marketplace of ideas, and so on. As Chief Justice Burg-
er wrote in Wooley v. Maynard, “[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain 
 
 13. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (“The very enumera-
tion of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Govern-
ment—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting 
upon.”). 
 14. The closest analogues are the “conscientious objector” provisions found in the 
gun-rights guarantees of many state constitutions and in an early draft of the Second 
Amendment itself. These are addressed in more detail below, see infra Part III.B, but are not 
analogous to the “negative” right described here, because they apply to military service, not 
bearing arms in self-defense.  
 15. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 17 (1996) (“[T]he idea that 
freedoms are bilateral” means “that the freedom to do x entails the freedom not to do x.”); id. 
at 39 (“It is axiomatic in modern constitutional law that freedoms are bilateral rights.”).  
As noted in the Conclusion of this Article, having a right not to engage in particular 
constitutionally salient activities such as speech, religious practice, or association is not the 
same thing as having a generalized right against coercion. Some constitutional challenges to 
the individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 
U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010), have relied on something like the latter. This Article has 
nothing to offer them. I attempt a broader account and explanation in Joseph Blocher, Rights 
To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 16. Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
97, 97 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/the-first-and-second-amendments 
(“Analogies between the First Amendment and the Second (and comparable state constitu-
tional protections) are over 200 years old.”); see, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 595, 635; Mil-
ler, supra note 6; L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1311 (1997). 
 17. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘indi-
vidual freedom of mind.’”18 Justice Brennan emphasized that symmetry in Ri-
ley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina: “[T]he First 
Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the 
decision of both what to say and what not to say.”19 Following the same logic, 
one might say that after Heller the Second Amendment guarantees freedom of 
armed self-protection, a concept necessarily comprising the decision of both 
what arms to keep and what arms not to keep. 
But what would it mean to have a right not to keep or bear arms, and what 
relevance would that right have in practice? Traditionally, gun regulations have 
limited citizens’ ability to have or carry guns. The usual Second Amendment 
question, therefore, has been whether such limitations are constitutional. But 
some legislatures are now contemplating or doing something quite different: 
pursuing “anti-gun control” laws that supersede private ordering by making it 
difficult or illegal for private parties to keep guns out of their homes, off their 
property, and otherwise out of their actual or constructive possession. Perhaps 
most radically, some have proposed or enacted laws requiring citizens to keep 
guns in their homes.20 Many others have adopted “forced entry” or “take your 
gun to work” laws, which require private parties—usually businesses—to allow 
guns on their property.21 And even concealed carry rules arguably burden the 
ability not to keep arms, because they make it substantially more difficult for 
people to monitor whether unwanted guns are being brought onto their property 
or into their homes.22 
Parts I and II of this Article argue that the new self-defense-based reading 
of the Second Amendment suggests recognition of a right not to keep or bear 
arms; Part III explores that right’s practical significance. Part I begins by de-
scribing how the terms “keep” and “bear” were redefined through changing in-
terpretations of the Second Amendment’s core purpose. Though those words 
were long understood to have a military connotation, scholars, advocates, and 
courts in recent decades have come to see them as referring to private, individ-
ual possession and use of guns. This new understanding, which broadly equates 
“keeping” a gun with “having” it in one’s possession and “bearing” a gun with 
“carrying” it, is intertwined with the new view of the Second Amendment as 
grounded in self-protection. 
Part II explores the constitutional protection of rights not to engage in ac-
tivities which would, if undertaken voluntarily, be constitutionally protected. 
Not every constitutional right carries with it such an inverse right. There is no 
 
 18. 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
 19. 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988). 
 20. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 21. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 22. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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Thirteenth Amendment right to sell oneself into slavery, for example.23 But 
others do—people have constitutional rights to decide whether to speak,24 
whether to associate,25 “whether to bear or beget a child,”26 and whether to ac-
cept the assistance of counsel.27 Such rights often exist where the underlying 
reasons for protecting the “affirmative” right are also furthered by the “nega-
tive” right. Thus the First Amendment protects speech and silence because they 
both serve core First Amendment purposes like the protection of individual au-
tonomy and the preservation of the marketplace of ideas. By contrast, the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s abolitionist purpose would be hindered, not helped, if 
people were permitted to sell themselves into slavery.  
Extending this approach to the Second Amendment context, it would seem 
that the decision not to have or carry arms should be constitutionally protected 
if it serves the amendment’s core purpose—individual self-defense, according 
to Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago.28 That is, if the “core” and “central 
component” of the Second Amendment is a right to make decisions about 
armed self-defense in the home, and if not possessing guns is one such deci-
sion, then forcing someone to possess a gun amounts to compelled keeping and 
violates the amendment’s core purpose.  
Part III describes the contours and possible practical import of a right not 
to keep or bear arms. Subpart A explores the right not to keep, which, like the 
right to keep, would be roughly coextensive with a person’s property rights. 
Thus if voluntarily having a gun in one’s home constitutes “keeping” within the 
scope of the Second Amendment, then being forced to have a gun in one’s 
home constitutes compelled keeping. The latter implicates precisely the same 
constitutional interests as the former, because it limits the homeowner’s ability 
to make decisions about how best to protect herself using guns and thereby to 
prevent violence in her home. This potentially calls into question the constitu-
tionality of laws compelling private owners or businesses to permit guns on 
their property. Whether such laws are actually unconstitutional is difficult to 
say—the answer depends among other things on the still-undefined standard of 
review for Second Amendment claims—but at the very least they help illustrate 
the potential significance of the right not to keep arms. 
Subpart B briefly evaluates the right not to bear, which would protect an 
individual from being forced to “carry” arms. The practical scope of this right 
is limited, if only because the government rarely compels citizens to carry arms 
or burdens their ability not to. A right not to bear arms could give rise to 
 
 23. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (holding that Thirteenth Amendment 
rights cannot be waived). 
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. See infra notes 134 through 137 and accompanying text. 
 26. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 27. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 28. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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Second Amendment arguments—albeit weak and unsuccessful ones—against 
compulsory military service. But just as the First Amendment’s right not to 
speak does not include an absolute right to refuse to salute one’s commanding 
officer, the right not to keep or bear arms would not give soldiers a constitu-
tional right not to carry weapons.  
The purpose of this Article is to test the strengths and weaknesses of an 
idea, not to advocate without qualification for the recognition of a new consti-
tutional right. The idea itself is deeply counterintuitive, and there are serious 
objections to it.29 It is not necessarily true that the decision not to keep guns is 
the equivalent of self-defense, for example, nor is it obviously correct that be-
ing denied the right to exclude guns from one’s property is the equivalent of 
being forced to “keep” them. The Article attempts to address those and other 
objections, and by doing so to cast light not only on the idea of a negative 
Second Amendment right, but also on the affirmative right of which it may or 
may not be a reflection. 
The Article takes Heller and McDonald as given, and uses them as depar-
ture points for analysis rather than targets of criticism. The goal here, as in oth-
er post-Heller scholarship,30 is to flesh out the new Second Amendment, and to 
determine the implications of a right whose central component and core is self-
defense. The Article therefore focuses not on the question of whether Heller 
and McDonald were rightly decided but rather on the question of their imple-
mentation, a question the Court itself has recognized as largely unanswered.31 
The discussion also seeks to highlight a simple but often underappreciated 
fact, one that helps explain the bitterness of the political and scholarly debate 
over the Second Amendment: both sides are invoking self-defense and personal 
safety interests.32 In Heller, the Supreme Court attempted to short-circuit the 
 
 29. One overarching methodological point is worth addressing at the outset. The ap-
proach here is decidedly not originalist, at least inasmuch as it does not rely on historical 
evidence that the Framers did or would have specifically rejected laws requiring people to 
keep or bear arms in self-defense. (I do, of course, address the conscientious objector exemp-
tions and the Militia Acts, see infra notes 201, 232-39, and accompanying text, though ad-
mittedly I find it hard to square them with Heller itself, let alone the self-defense framework 
explored here.) Those who hope to find originalist evidence as to whether particular contem-
porary gun control laws are constitutional may therefore be disappointed, though it should be 
noted that Heller itself did not provide any originalist evidence for the gun control measures 
it approved. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008). Even so, the 
analysis here makes every effort to stay within Heller’s framework and to tease out the poss-
ible logical implications of the “central component” of the right the Court found to be rooted 
in original understandings.  
 30. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 16. 
 31. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“But since this case represents this Court’s first in-
depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire 
field . . . . And there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the 
exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”). 
 32. Cf. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3108 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Hence, in evaluating 
an asserted right to be free from particular gun-control regulations, liberty is on both sides of 
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conflict by saying that one side’s policy preferences were irrelevant because the 
other had a constitutional right to defend itself with guns. But that did not re-
solve the underlying tension, and the growing number of laws that limit private 
gun control demonstrate with increasing clarity that if the Second Amendment 
is, at its core, a guarantee of self-defense interests, then it may speak to those 
who do not want to keep guns as well as those who do. This is not an argument 
for gun control, but rather a suggestion that if gun control laws are to be subject 
to constitutional scrutiny on the basis that they infringe self-defense interests, 
then anti-gun control laws should be as well. Arming one side of the debate 
with a constitutional sword means arming the other with a constitutional shield. 
I. THE MEANINGS OF “KEEP” AND “BEAR” 
The Second Amendment protects a range of individual activity, and yet the 
verbs that define that activity—“keep” and “bear”—rarely figure prominently 
in legal and popular debates about the amendment’s meaning. Instead, other 
words in the amendment—“well-regulated,” “militia,” “the people,” and even 
“arms”—generally drive the discussion, with the definitions of “keep” and 
“bear” shifting to accommodate them. In Heller, for example, the Court began 
its textual analysis with “right of the people,”33 then moved on to “arms,”34 and 
only then to the phrases “keep arms”’ and “bear arms.”35 This relative neglect 
of the Second Amendment’s major verbs must be remedied, for in order to un-
derstand the scope of the right protected by the amendment, one must know 
what actions it covers. Is a person “keeping” a gun when it is stored in a locked 
safe in a toolshed? Is he “bearing” it if the gun is in the glove compartment of 
his car?36 Understanding the scope of these “affirmative” rights is also neces-
sary for analyzing the right not to keep or bear. If keeping and bearing are in-
terpreted broadly, then not-keeping and not-bearing should be as well. If the 
right to keep extends to guns that are not in one’s immediate possession, then 
the right not to keep should have a similar reach. 
These understandings of the Second Amendment’s verbs depend on how 
one interprets the amendment as a whole, but it is not the purpose of this Ar-
ticle to revisit the debate over whether the Second Amendment is solely con-
cerned with militias, nor even to suggest that one or the other reading of “keep 
 
the equation. . . . Your interest in keeping and bearing a certain firearm may diminish my in-
terest in being and feeling safe from armed violence.”). 
 33. 554 U.S. at 579-81. 
 34. Id. at 581-82. 
 35. Id. at 582. Those phrases do not appear in the Second Amendment, of course, but 
the majority concluded that the phrase “keep and bear arms” should be considered in two 
parts, id. at 591, and I will do so here. 
 36. Cf. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (considering whether driving 
a car with a gun in the glove compartment constitutes “carrying” it within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).  
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and bear” is preferable. The central holding of Heller, of course, was that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms inde-
pendent of militia service.37 McDonald affirmed that holding and made it ap-
plicable against the states.38 The argument here accepts Heller and McDonald 
as correct and controlling, and refers to the pre-Heller understanding of the 
Second Amendment only in order to demonstrate the changes that Heller 
brought about. The goal of this Part is to frame the rest of the Article’s argu-
ment by explaining how the central debate over the purpose of the Second 
Amendment impacts the meanings of the words “keep” and “bear.” 
For present purposes, then, the relevant point is a descriptive one: When 
Heller and McDonald shifted the meaning of the Second Amendment away 
from militias and toward personal self-defense, they also altered the class of 
activities that constitute keeping and bearing. Those who understand the 
Second Amendment as protecting a militia-related right read the phrase “keep 
and bear arms” to connote the military use of weapons. But under Heller’s “in-
dividual right” reading of the amendment,39 this military understanding is 
simply idiomatic. According to the Court’s view, the word “keep” broadly de-
notes “having” a gun in one’s home or otherwise constructively possessing it, 
while the word “bear” refers to carrying a gun on one’s person.  
The new meanings of “keep” and “bear” are important because they indi-
cate that a new class of individual activity is now protected by the Second 
Amendment, and for a different reason than before. It is this shift that makes 
the right not to keep or bear arms both constitutionally relevant and practically 
important. If the purpose of the Second Amendment were protecting state mili-
tias from disarmament by the federal government, then an individual’s decision 
not to keep or bear arms—not to use them in a military sense, that is—would 
probably have little constitutional relevance, at least as far as the Second 
Amendment is concerned.40 Refusing to bear arms would probably do nothing 
to further the amendment’s purpose of protecting state militias from disarma-
ment, and might even hinder it.  
But if the purpose of the Second Amendment is to protect a right to self-
defense, as Heller and McDonald indicate, then the decision not to keep or bear 
arms may have constitutional significance for the simple reason that such a de-
cision can be, and often is, rooted in concerns about personal safety and self-
defense—values the Court has now identified as the amendment’s central com-
ponent. Since the self-defense reading of the Second Amendment creates ex-
pansive new definitions for the words “keep” and “bear,” it follows that a right 
 
 37. 554 U.S. at 598-600. 
 38. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010). 
 39. It has become standard practice to refer to the non-militia-based reading of the 
Second Amendment as the “individual rights” view.  
 40. One might claim conscientious objection to military arms-bearing, but that is not 
an argument based on the Second Amendment itself. 
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not to keep or bear—the mirror image of the affirmative right—might have 
broad practical implications as well. 
A. The Traditional Understanding: Military Terms 
Heller’s apparent protestations to the contrary,41 the Second Amendment 
was long understood by many if not most courts and scholars to protect state 
militias from disarmament by the federal government.42 Under this militia-
based interpretation, the phrase “keep and bear arms” was read as referring to 
the possession and use of weapons in connection with militia service.  
The word “bear” does the lion’s share of the work in this regard. Adherents 
to the militia-based reading of the Second Amendment argue that the phrase’s 
plain meaning is military: “The term ‘bear arms’ is a familiar idiom; when used 
unadorned by any additional words, its meaning is ‘to serve as a soldier, do 
military service, fight.’”43 As historian Gary Wills put it, “To bear arms is, in 
itself, a military term. One does not bear arms against a rabbit.”44 This basic 
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that “bear” was and is often used in con-
junction with “arms,” creating a combination of words (“bear arms”) that de-
rives from the Latin arma ferre, which translates directly as bear war equip-
ment.45 Bearing arms therefore had a different meaning from, for example, 
bearing guns.46 
Supporters of this view point to historical evidence suggesting that the 
Framers used “bear arms” to refer to military activity. For example, scholars 
 
 41. See 554 U.S. at 622, 625 (concluding that “nothing in our precedents forecloses 
our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment” and that United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), “is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, 
that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms”).  
 42. That the militia-based approach was indeed the accepted (even if incorrect) view is 
demonstrated in part by the intensity of the reactions, both positive and negative, that Heller 
provoked. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of 
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Su-
preme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32-35. In any event, the 
central argument of this Article does not depend on whether the militia view ever prevailed. 
If one believes that Heller was nothing but an affirmation of long-standing and well-
recognized precedent, then this Subpart may be read as simply a description of what might 
have been.  
 43. Heller, 554 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 1 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 634 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 44. Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62, 64; 
see also Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161 (1840) (“A man in the pursuit of deer, 
elk, and buffaloes might carry his rifle every day for forty years, and yet it would never be 
said of him that he had borne arms . . . .”). 
 45. Heller, 554 U.S. at 646-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wills, supra note 44, at 64.  
 46. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control 
Debate: The Right to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 579 (2006) (“The claim that bearing a gun and bearing arms were le-
gally synonymous in the Founding era is simply false.”). 
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have demonstrated that in Founding-era congressional debates the term “bear 
arms” was used almost exclusively to denote military activity.47 Debates over 
the wording of the Second Amendment included discussion of whether con-
scientious objectors should be exempted from “bearing arms”48 or permitted to 
employ others to bear arms in their place.49 Those exceptions make little sense 
except in the military context.50 Others have argued that the general public 
shared the Framers’ view of the phrase “bear arms” as having a military mean-
ing. An amicus brief filed by a group of linguists and English professors in Hel-
ler concluded that, out of 115 texts published between the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the adoption of the Second Amendment, the phrase “bear arms” 
was used 110 times in a clearly military context, four other times in contexts 
that were not clearly military but which included qualifying language convey-
ing a different meaning, and only once, unadorned, in a nonmilitary context.51  
Because it is broader, the meaning of the word “keep” does not support the 
militia reading as directly as the word “bear.” Even so, scholars have hig-
hlighted evidence suggesting that it could be, and often was, used to refer to the 
maintenance of militia stores. The Articles of Confederation, for example, re-
quired that “every state shall always keep up a well regulated and disciplined 
militia, sufficiently armed and accounted, and shall provide and constantly have 
ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a 
proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage.”52 In his Heller dis-
sent, Justice Stevens pointed to the fact that “a number of state militia laws in 
effect at the time of the Second Amendment’s drafting used the term ‘keep’ to 
describe the requirement that militia members store their arms at their homes, 
 
 47. See Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 291, 314 (2000) (“Overwhelmingly, the term had a military connotation. . . . 
Searching for the phrase ‘bear arms’ in the Library of Congress’s database of congressional 
and other documents from the founding era produces a great many references, nearly all of 
them in a military context.”). 
 48. Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism, History, and the Second Amendment: What Did 
Bearing Arms Really Mean to the Founders?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 413, 432 (2008) (“Mad-
ison reasoned that while ‘[i]t was possible to oppress their sect,’ no one had ever been able 
‘to make [the Quakers] bear arms,’ and so Congress would be wise to ‘make a virtue of ne-
cessity, and grant them the privilege.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Sketch of the Debates 
on Part of the Militia Bill, GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Dec. 27, 1790, at 2)).  
 49. Id. at 431. 
 50. Heller, 554 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is no plausible argument 
that the use of ‘bear arms’ in those provisions was not unequivocally and exclusively mili-
tary: The State simply does not compel its citizens to carry arms for the purpose of private 
‘confrontation,’ or for self-defense.” (citation omitted)). 
 51. Brief for Professors of Linguistics & English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D., Richard W. 
Bailey, Ph.D. & Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Ph.D. in Support of Petitioners at 23-25, Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157194. 
 52. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 4. 
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ready to be used for service when necessary.”53 Some scholars have bolstered 
this view with pre-Framing evidence.54 
Finally, many have argued that the phrase “keep and bear arms” is effec-
tively unitary, which in turn reinforces a militia-based reading of the Second 
Amendment. As Justice Stevens put it in his Heller dissent:  
[T]he clause protects only one right, rather than two. It does not describe a 
right ‘to keep . . . Arms’ and a separate right ‘to bear . . . Arms.’ Rather, the 
single right that it does describe is both a duty and a right to have arms availa-
ble and ready for military service, and to use them for military purposes when 
necessary.55  
The Heller majority rejected this argument, however, treating “keep” and 
“bear” as separate verbs protecting different kinds of action. The following 
Subpart describes that approach. 
B. The New Understanding: Self-Defense Terms 
In Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an “individ-
ual” right to bear arms disconnected from militia service. The majority found 
that although “self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification[,] it was 
the central component of the right itself.”56 Two Terms later, in McDonald, the 
Court reaffirmed this reading and held that the individual right to armed self-
defense is “among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered 
liberty” and is therefore applicable against the states.57 
As a textual matter, Heller’s reading of the Second Amendment was based 
primarily on the words “right of the people,” which the Court interpreted as re-
ferring to all citizens, not just the select militia.58 But the majority did not ig-
nore the phrase “keep and bear arms.” Dismissing the traditional militia-related 
reading of that phrase as capturing only an “idiomatic” meaning,59 the majority 
decoupled the words “keep” and “bear”60 and gave them much broader defini-
tions. “Keep,” the majority concluded, refers to the act of “possessing” or “hav-
ing” a gun, for example, in one’s home.61 “Bear,” meanwhile, means to “carry” 
 
 53. 554 U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Militia Act of 1785, ch. 
1, § 3, 1785 Va. Acts 1, 2). 
 54. See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True 
Legal and Historical Understanding of the Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO 
L. REV. DE NOVO 18, 47, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/CHARLES 
_2010_18.pdf (arguing that in seventeenth-century England “the allowance to ‘have arms’ 
was a preexisting customary right to defend the realm as a militia”). 
 55. 554 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 599 (majority opinion).  
 57. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010). 
 58. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 579-81.  
 59. Id. at 586. 
 60. Id. at 591 (rejecting Justice Stevens’s “unitary” reading of the phrase).  
 61. Id. at 582. 
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a gun on one’s person.62 Compared to the earlier, militia-related understandings 
described above, these definitions extended constitutional protection to a vast 
range of private activity. 
1. Keeping as having 
Whereas supporters of the militia-based reading of the Second Amendment 
have traditionally focused on the word “bear,” the Heller majority drew its 
strongest support from the word “keep,” which it found to mean “have wea-
pons”: 
Johnson defined “keep” as, most relevantly, “[t]o retain; not to lose,” and “[t]o 
have in custody.” Webster defined it as “[t]o hold; to retain in one’s power or 
possession.” No party has apprised us of an idiomatic meaning of “keep 
Arms.” Thus, the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second 
Amendment is to “have weapons.”63 
The majority supported this conclusion by looking to “written documents 
of the founding period,” which it found to show that “‘[k]eep arms’ was simply 
a common way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone 
else.”64  
The majority’s reading was in line with that of scholars who argue that 
“keep” means to possess. Glenn Harlan Reynolds and Don Kates, for example, 
conclude that “the term ‘keep’ refers to owning arms that are kept in one’s 
household.”65 Robert E. Shalhope points to the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
treatment of the word “keep,” the twenty-ninth definition of which is “actively 
to hold in possession; to retain in one’s power or control; to continue to have, 
hold, or possess.”66 And Robert H. Churchill argues that “[t]he language of 
‘keeping arms’ . . . had a colloquial meaning that applied to individuals outside 
of the context of militia service.”67 
These scholars invoke historical evidence, often beginning with the 1689 
English Bill of Rights, which states in part that “the Subjects which are Protes-
tants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as al-
 
 62. Id. at 584. 
 63. Id. at 582 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
 64. Id. at 582-83. 
 65. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. 
REV. 461, 482 (1995) (citing Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original 
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 267 (1983)). 
 66. Robert E. Shalhope, To Keep and Bear Arms in the Early Republic, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 269, 279 (1999) (quoting 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 
372).  
 67. Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep 
Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 
139, 148 (2007). Churchill nevertheless concludes that “the framers of the amendment were 
concerned primarily with the constitutional organization of political violence rather than in-
dividual rights.” Id. at 174.  
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lowed by Law.”68 Some argue that the “have arms” language in the English 
Bill of Rights is the precursor to the “keep . . . arms” language in the Second 
Amendment, and that Blackstone interpreted the “have arms” protection in 
English law as ensuring the “natural right of resistance and self-
preservation”69—a right to armed self-defense.70 Joyce Lee Malcolm, in her 
influential review of the English background of the right to keep and bear arms, 
concludes that the English Bill of Rights “came down squarely, and exclusive-
ly, in favour of an individual right to have arms for self-defence.”71 
This scholarship, like Heller’s own reasoning, ties the broad definition of 
“keep” to a view of the Second Amendment as protecting a right to possess 
arms for self-defense. If self-defense in the home is the essence of the right, 
then having a gun in one’s home (or in one’s garage, attic, or outdoor shed) 
must count as “keeping” it.72 
2. Bearing as carrying 
The Heller majority’s definition of “bear” was straightforward: “At the 
time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’”73 The majority ac-
knowledged that “bear arms” had an idiomatic military meaning,74 but found 
that it was not limited to military service. Instead, the majority concluded that 
“[w]hen used with ‘arms,’ . . . the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for 
a particular purpose—confrontation.”75 The majority suggested that “confron-
tation” can be equated with “offensive or defensive action.”76 
 
 68. Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.). 
 69. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. 
 70. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594-95 (2008). 
 71. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT 120 (1994) (emphasis added). But see Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and 
Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 27, 28, 60 (2000) (criticizing 
elements of Malcolm’s analysis and concluding that “there was no unrestricted English right 
of the individual to possess guns for the colonists to inherit”).  
 72. Cf. State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 808 (Wis. 2003) (“If the constitutional right 
to keep and bear arms for security is to mean anything, it must, as a general matter, permit a 
person to possess, carry, and sometimes conceal arms to maintain the security of his private 
residence or privately operated business, and to safely move and store weapons within these 
premises.”). 
 73. 554 U.S. at 584 (citing, inter alia, 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 43, 
at 20; THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (John An-
drews ed., 6th ed. 1796)). 
 74. Some gun-rights scholars have concluded that “bear” refers to possession in a mili-
tary setting, while “keep” refers to individual possession in the home. See, e.g., Kates, supra 
note 65, at 219 (concluding that “‘bear’ did generally refer to the carrying of arms by mili-
tiamen,” while “‘keep’ was commonly used in colonial and early state statutes to describe 
arms possession by individuals in all contexts, not just in relation to militia service”).  
 75. 554 U.S. at 584. 
 76. Id. 
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Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court conducted a “review of founding-era 
sources,” from which it “conclude[d] that this natural meaning was also the 
meaning that ‘bear arms’ had in the 18th century. In numerous instances, ‘bear 
arms’ was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of 
an organized militia.”77 The Court discounted the evidence, presented in ami-
cus briefs by linguists and historians, that “bear arms” was most often used in 
the military context: “[T]he fact that the phrase was commonly used in a par-
ticular context does not show that it is limited to that context, and, in any event, 
we have given many sources where the phrase was used in nonmilitary con-
texts.”78 In his opinion below for the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals striking 
down the District of Columbia’s gun regulations, Judge Silberman reached a 
similar conclusion, writing that “the public understanding of ‘bear Arms’ also 
encompassed the carrying of arms for private purposes such as self-defense.”79 
Many gun-rights scholars agree, pointing to Patrick Henry’s statement that 
“[t]he great object is that every man be armed. . . . Every one who is able may 
have a gun,” and arguing that Henry’s statement equates bearing arms with 
having guns, rather than with military service.80  
The examples and citations could be multiplied, but already two elements 
of Heller’s rationale are apparent: first, that the core of the Second Amendment 
right is self-defense; and second, that the words “keep” and “bear” must be in-
terpreted with that central purpose in mind. The former principle stands out not 
only through the Court’s general framework of analysis, but through its explicit 
holding that the core of the Second Amendment is “the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”81 Indeed, de-
spite noting that “self-defense had little to do with the [arms-bearing] right’s 
 
 77. Id. at 584; see also id. at 584-85 (noting that nine state constitutional provisions 
written in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries protected the right to “bear arms 
in defense of themselves and the state”). 
 78. Id. at 588. Justice Stevens strongly criticized this reading of “bear arms,” quoting 
one of Justice Scalia’s own dissenting opinions: “The Court does not appear to grasp the dis-
tinction between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.” Id. at 649 n.11 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 145, 173 (2008) (“Justice Scalia had no knock-down response to himself, for 
Justice Stevens scored a direct hit when he quoted the language of [Scalia’s dissent in 
Smith] . . . .”). 
 79. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also id. (“[I]t would hardly have 
been unusual for a writer at the time (or now) to have said that, after an attack on a house by 
thieves, the men set out to find them ‘bearing arms.’”). Some historians have disputed Judge 
Silberman’s conclusion, saying that it is “demonstrably false.” See, e.g., Kozuskanich, supra 
note 48, at 415. 
 80. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 65, at 466-69 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 384 (Jona-
than Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) (1836) [hereinafter DEBATES] (omission in 
original)). 
 81. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.  
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codification,” the majority concluded that self-defense was “the central compo-
nent of the right itself” because the Second Amendment was “widely unders-
tood to codify a pre-existing right, rather than to fashion a new one.”82 That 
preexisting right, deriving from Blackstone’s “natural right of resistance and 
self-preservation,”83 amounted to an “individual right to use arms for self-
defense.”84 
But Heller does not simply reaffirm the traditional right to act in self-
defense when threatened. Rather, it recognizes a right to have and carry guns in 
case the need for such an action should arise. In other words, the activity pro-
tected by Heller—the possession and carrying of guns—is not itself an act of 
self-defense, but a means of enabling such acts. Accordingly, the “self-defense” 
constitutionalized in Heller is not simply the traditional conception of resisting 
an attack, but something more like a right to make self-defense-related deci-
sions regarding guns. Because this right can be exercised even when no person-
al threat is imminent, it is in many ways broader than the traditional conception 
of self-defense.85 But as with traditional acts of self-defense, the Court empha-
sized that the right to arm oneself against potential future threats has special sa-
lience within the home.86 Of course, the precise implications of that reading 
remain murky. Is the Second Amendment’s self-defense right limited to guns 
and other “arms,” or does it constitutionalize the entire common law right to 
self-defense?87 Are all personal safety decisions now protected by the Second 
Amendment?88 The answer to the latter question, at least, must surely be no. 
Rather than reading Heller to stand for a broad right to make personal safety 
 
 82. Id. at 599, 603.  
 83. Id. at 594 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139). 
 84. Id. at 603. 
 85. See Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Crimi-
nal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1205, 1207 (2009) (“The majority opinion describes the right to keep and bear 
arms as essentially the right to have a firearm available for immediate self-defense purpos-
es.”). 
 86. See Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1371 (2009) (“Justice Sca-
lia’s opinion for the Court suggested that the right was primarily about individual self-
defense, particularly in ‘the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute.’”); see also supra note 6 and sources cited therein.  
 87. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for 
the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 248 (2008) (“It is now beyond dispute in an American 
court that self-defense is an inherent right, and that it is protected by the United States Con-
stitution.”); David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the 
Uses of Guns, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641, 641 (2008) (“The Court held that the Second Amend-
ment gives individuals a right not only to get a gun but also to use it for certain purposes, 
especially self-defense. And if the Constitution protects the right to use a gun for self-
defense, then it follows that the Constitution must also protect the underlying right to self-
defense itself.”). 
 88. See infra Part III (discussing the distinction between self-defense and personal 
safety rationales). 
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decisions, this Article limits it to the decision of whether to keep or bear a gun 
in self-defense.  
The second notable element of Heller’s rationale is the idea that “keep” 
and “bear” must be interpreted in line with this self-defense purpose. Since 
Heller and McDonald reinterpreted the Second Amendment as protecting a 
right of the people to keep and bear arms in self-defense, courts and scholars 
have begun the difficult task of defining which guns count as “arms,”89 which 
people count as “the people,”90 and what kinds of regulations of each are per-
missible.91 They have often done so by referring to the self-defense values un-
derlying the amendment. For example, the Heller majority held that the Second 
Amendment protects only the types of “arms” that are commonly used for 
“lawful purposes like self-defense.”92 Handguns, the Court found, fall within 
this definition because they are the “most popular weapon chosen by Ameri-
cans for self-defense in the home.”93 
It stands to reason that courts and scholars will take a similar approach 
when defining “keep” and “bear.” Heller indicates that the words should be in-
terpreted broadly, but how much so? If a person has a pistol in her office, or 
locked in a safe, or stored in a toolshed, is she “keeping” it even though it is not 
immediately available for self-defense? If she places a gun in the glove box of 
her car, is she “bearing” it?94 What is clear is that the words “keep” and “bear” 
no longer refer to the possession and use of weapons in connection with mili-
tary service. Instead, they refer to broad rights of personal possession for pur-
poses of self-defense. 
Although many important questions remain to be answered, the debates de-
scribed above demonstrate a changing trajectory of meaning, one that points in 
the direction of private self-defense uses but whose precise implications remain 
unclear. Those uses, in turn, are rooted in and defined by the core and central 
component of the Second Amendment: self-defense. Knowing that, one can be-
 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting 
challenge to ban on possession of machine guns and sawed-off shotguns). 
 90. The majority gestured towards an all-expansive definition of “the people,” but also 
denied the right to certain groups of people, including felons and the mentally ill. See Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008); see also United States v. Portillo-
Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011) (denying Second Amendment coverage to undocu-
mented immigrants), petition for cert. filed, No. 11-7200 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2011); United States 
v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 690 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding intermediate scrutiny applicable to 
bans on firearm possession by those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vi-
olence); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting Second 
Amendment challenge to ban on possession of firearms by those convicted of a misdemea-
nor crime of domestic violence), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011). 
 91. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1475-
515 (2009). 
 92. 554 U.S. at 624. 
 93. Id. at 629. 
 94. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1998). 
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gin to determine what kinds of actions and decisions the amendment protects 
from governmental interference. 
II. RIGHTS NOT TO 
Sometimes, but not always, a constitutional right to do something is ac-
companied by a right not to do that thing. This Article refers to these rights—
which guarantee both X and not-X—as “choice rights.”95 The purpose of this 
Part is not to give a complete account of and justification for these rights, but 
rather to make some observations about how they might be separated from oth-
er, take-it-or-leave-it rights—those that constitutionally guarantee a right to en-
gage in a particular activity, without a corresponding right not to do so. This 
initial foray suggests that choice rights arise where the constitutional values 
underlying the right are furthered by protecting the decision whether to engage 
in the enumerated activity, and not simply by protecting the activity itself. In 
other words, a right to do X encompasses a right not to do X where the prin-
ciples justifying the right to do X also justify the right not to do X.96 
A. The Right Not to Speak 
In order to provide a useful comparator for the right not to keep or bear 
arms, this Subpart first explores the right not to speak, the closest and most fa-
miliar cousin of the right not to keep or bear arms.97 Because it permits indi-
viduals to decide whether to speak, the First Amendment creates what this Ar-
ticle calls a choice right. The existence and contours of that right are tied 
directly to underlying First Amendment values like individual autonomy and 
the marketplace of ideas. This suggests that not-X rights can spring from the 
rationales and purposes of X rights. 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court 
found that schoolchildren have a First Amendment right not to salute the flag or 
say the Pledge of Allegiance.98 Justice Jackson gave a characteristically quota-
ble justification for this right: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force cit-
izens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”99 That basic idea—indeed 
 
 95. In Rights To and Not To, I explore the concept of choice rights in more detail, 
along with their counterparts “option rights” (rights to X, but not not-X) and “protection 
rights” (rights to not-X, but not X). See Blocher, supra note 15. 
 96. I argue in Rights To and Not To that this is not the only way that choice rights 
come about. See id. 
 97. Courts and scholars have often looked to the First Amendment for guidance in 
evaluating the Second Amendment. See sources cited supra note 16.  
 98. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 99. Id. 
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that very passage—has been a pillar of First Amendment jurisprudence for al-
most seventy years,100 despite the fact that the amendment’s text says nothing 
specifically about a right or freedom not to speak.  
The other leading case in the compelled speech canon arose more than thir-
ty years later. In Wooley v. Maynard,101 two Jehovah’s Witnesses objected to 
having the New Hampshire state motto (“Live Free or Die”) emblazoned on 
their cars’ license plates. Prosecuted for covering the motto with tape, they ar-
gued that requiring them to display it violated their First Amendment rights by 
compelling them to endorse a message they did not support. The Supreme 
Court agreed, finding that the state law impermissibly required individuals to 
“use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological 
message.”102  
In both Barnette and Wooley, the Court held that private parties were 
shielded by the First Amendment from being required to engage in activities—
expressive conduct—that undoubtedly would have been constitutionally pro-
tected had they been done voluntarily. The Court has taken a similar approach 
in cases involving what is often called “compelled subsidization.”103 In Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education,104 for example, teachers argued that they had a 
First Amendment right not to have their legally required union fees spent on 
various union activities they did not support. Such an arrangement, they 
claimed, violated their right to free speech by forcing them to pay for speech 
they did not support.105 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that “in a free so-
ciety one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than 
coerced by the State.”106 Had the teachers paid dues for the union’s political 
activities voluntarily, they surely would have been engaged in protected speech. 
That the dues were required did not change the nature of the activity as speech; 
it simply made it compelled rather than free. 
The existence of the right not to speak raises an obvious but difficult ques-
tion: why protect such a right? The reasons for prohibiting compelled speech 
 
100. See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 76-77 (1992) 
(calling Barnette “among the most eloquent pronouncements ever on First Amendment free-
doms”); Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN 
STATE 317, 320 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) (referring to Barnette as a “great opi-
nion”). 
101. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
102. Id. at 715. 
103. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (“We have sus-
tained First Amendment challenges to allegedly compelled expression in two categories of 
cases: true ‘compelled-speech’ cases, in which an individual is obliged personally to express 
a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government; and ‘compelled-subsidy’ cases, in 
which an individual is required by the government to subsidize a message he disagrees with, 
expressed by a private entity.”).  
104. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  
105. Id. at 213. 
106. Id. at 235. 
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are diverse and contested, but no more or less so than those for protecting 
speech itself. In fact, they mirror each other, for the simple reason that the free-
dom to speak and the freedom not to speak protect the same constitutional val-
ues, whether those are thought to derive from autonomy, the marketplace of 
ideas, or something else entirely. The reasons for banning compelled speech 
therefore track the reasons for protecting speech itself. First and perhaps most 
prominently, the right not to speak has been conceptualized as a means of pro-
tecting individual autonomy or self-realization, which in turn has long been 
considered a core component of the “affirmative” right to speak.107 In Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Justice Souter’s 
opinion for the Court made this connection, concluding that compelled speech 
“violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a 
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”108 Simi-
larly, in Wooley, the Court emphasized that the state’s interests did not out-
weigh “the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the major-
ity and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they find morally objectionable.”109 As in 
Barnette, the emphasis was on the individual’s right to refuse, not necessarily 
on how the marketplace of ideas would or would not be impacted by compelled 
expression.110  
The individual autonomy rationale has also found favor in scholarly efforts 
to identify and explain the harms caused by compelled speech. Thomas Emer-
son, for example, wrote that “[t]he full protection extended to the right of belief 
in the Barnette case is essential to an effective system of freedom of expres-
sion. Forcing public expression of a belief is an affront to personal integri-
ty.”111 Seana Shiffrin argues that the result in Barnette “does not depend on 
any external effect,” but rather on “the illicit influence compelled speech may 
have on the character and autonomous thinking process of the compelled 
speaker.”112 Others conclude that compelled expression “infringe[s] upon what 
may be called the individual’s interest in selfhood”113 and that “[t]he protection 
against compelled expression is grounded primarily in concerns for individual 
liberty underlying freedom of speech.”114 The examples could be multiplied,115 
 
107. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 
593-94 (1982) (arguing that the primary interest served by free speech is “individual self-
realization,” which includes but is not limited to “liberty” and “autonomy”). 
108. 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). 
109. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
110. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
111. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 30 (1970). 
112. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 839, 840 (2005). 
113. David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled 
Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1004 (1982). 
114. Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 
77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 190 (2002). 
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but their import is clear—the autonomy rationale has been a dominant theme of 
compelled speech theory and doctrine. 
Another way to conceptualize the doctrine is by considering how com-
pelled speech harms not just the individual who is forced to speak, but the mar-
ketplace of ideas as a whole.116 The marketplace, after all, has been a guiding 
metaphor of First Amendment jurisprudence for almost a century now,117 de-
spite heavy criticism.118 The metaphor is generally traced to Justice Holmes’s 
famous statement that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”119 This suggests that speech 
has instrumental value because it is the best available mechanism for sorting 
good ideas from bad. Compelled speech threatens to distort that marketplace in 
a variety of ways. By forcing people to say things they do not believe, it gives 
prominence to ideas based not on how well they are “accepted in the competi-
tion of the market”120 but on whether they are favored by the relevant govern-
ment officials.121 That is, the basic principle of the marketplace of ideas is that 
people’s individual, autonomous decisions will eventually sort good ideas from 
bad. When people are not free to make those decisions, the marketplace itself 
malfunctions.122  
The marketplace argument against compelled speech has made occasional 
appearances in the Court’s free speech decisions. Justice Black wrote in dissent 
in Barenblatt v. United States, “It is this right, the right to err politically, which 
keeps us strong as a Nation. . . . It is these interests of society, rather than Ba-
renblatt’s own right to silence, which I think the Court should put on the bal-
ance against the demands of the Government, if any balancing process is to be 
 
115. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 978 (2009) (“Nor can the capacity for self-realization and 
self-determination, both central to our notion of human autonomy, flourish if the state injects 
itself into our thought processes.”). 
116. See, e.g., id. at 979 (“Compelled speech also distorts the marketplace of ideas and 
democratic decision-making by misrepresenting the views of speakers forced to propound a 
viewpoint that is not their own.”). 
117. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment 
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In Speech Clause jurisprudence, . . . the oft-
repeated metaphor that the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth 
to ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”). 
118. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communica-
tions, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673-96 (2006); 
Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951, 
962-63 (1997). 
119. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. 
121. Cf. HAIG BOSMAJIAN, THE FREEDOM NOT TO SPEAK 197 (1999) (citing THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 51, 
157-58 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944)). 
122. Cf. Wasserman, supra note 114, at 195 (noting the argument that “by restricting 
government’s power to compel expression, the First Amendment prevents government from 
manipulating, skewing, and distorting the marketplace”). 
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tolerated.”123 The marketplace distortion rationale takes on special weight in 
compelled subsidy cases like Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.124 By re-
quiring people to support speech with which they do not agree, compelled sub-
sidies distort the marketplace of ideas just as surely as it would distort the real-
world marketplace if businesses were required to financially subsidize their 
competitors. 
The point of this short excursion into First Amendment theory and doctrine 
is simply to show that the right to avoid compelled speech has often been justi-
fied for the same reasons as the right to speak.125 C. Edwin Baker, for example, 
argued that “respect for individual integrity and autonomy requires the recogni-
tion that a person has the right to use speech to develop herself or to influence 
or interact with others in a manner that corresponds to her values.”126 He simi-
larly concluded that “respect for the integrity and autonomy of the individual 
usually requires giving each person at least veto power over the use of her own 
body and, similarly, over her own speech.”127 Martin Redish has argued that 
free speech should be protected in part because of individual autonomy inter-
ests,128 and that compelled speech interferes with this autonomy by interfering 
with the capacity for critical analysis.129 Similar symmetries emerge in the 
works of other scholars who have grappled with the problem of compelled 
speech.130 
Because First Amendment jurisprudence and theory are relatively well-
elaborated, they provide a useful illustrative example of how courts and scho-
lars have derived negative rights from affirmative ones by looking to the rights’ 
underlying purposes. Free speech doctrine, in turn, has often served as a guide 
for Second Amendment questions. Indeed, “[a]nalogies between the First 
Amendment and the Second (and comparable state constitutional protections) 
 
123. 360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
124. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
125. One can imagine First Amendment rationales that would not create a choice right 
with regard to speech. If the amendment’s purpose were simply to increase the sum total of 
“speech,” then compelled speech might not be a First Amendment problem (although it 
might still violate other constitutional provisions, like the “liberty” protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
126. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989).  
127. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
REV. 964, 1000 (1978). 
128. See Redish, supra note 107. 
129. See Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First 
Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
1083, 1114-16 (1999). 
130. Thomas Emerson, to take one more example, concluded that “freedom of expres-
sion is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment,” EMERSON, supra note 
111, at 6, and that “[f]orcing public expression of a belief is an affront to personal integrity,” 
id. at 30. 
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are over 200 years old.”131 In Heller itself, the Court invoked the analogy re-
peatedly and at some length.132 There are undoubtedly many reasons why the 
comparison has proven so attractive. The amendments’ proximity in the Bill of 
Rights might be relevant, as is the fact that both seem to have special cachet in 
the American political and social imagination. Gun rights advocates in particu-
lar have long relied on free speech analogies in arguing that the Second 
Amendment, like the First, covers an “individual” right entitled to strong judi-
cial protection. For this Article, the analogy is especially useful for the simple 
reason that the First and Second Amendments—unlike, say, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause—directly guarantee the right to engage in an activity. 
But the argument here does not depend on whether the First and Second 
Amendments are comparable in all respects; it simply uses the First as an ex-
emplar of how “rights not to” can be identified. This Subpart has tried to show 
that when the underlying constitutional values—whether derived from individ-
ual autonomy, marketplace of ideas, or some other principle—are furthered by 
both positive and negative invocations of the right, individuals have a constitu-
tionally protected right to choose whether to speak. As the following Subpart 
explains, the same symmetries emerge in other areas of constitutional law, in-
cluding the Second Amendment. 
B. Other Rights Not To 
Free speech is not the only area of theory or doctrine to recognize choice 
rights. Religious practice provides a particularly interesting example, because 
the Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause, standing alone, prohibits the 
government from compelling individuals to engage in religious activity.133 The 
First Amendment’s freedom of association provides another useful example, 
for as the Court has noted, “[f]reedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a 
 
131. Volokh, supra note 16, at 97; see also DAVID B. KOPEL, TRUST THE PEOPLE: THE 
CASE AGAINST GUN CONTROL 25 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 109, 1988) (arguing that 
the Second Amendment, like the First, should be read to prohibit registration requirements); 
sources cited supra note 16. 
132. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“Thus, we do 
not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of 
confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to 
speak for any purpose.”); id. at 582 (“Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of 
communications, . . . the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that 
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”). 
133. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause prohibits the government from, among other things, “compel[ling] affirmation of re-
ligious beliefs”). Of course, the Establishment Clause may effectively do the same thing. See 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433 (1962) (holding that compelled prayer in schools violates 
the Establishment Clause); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (citing the Es-
tablishment Clause for the proposition that “[n]o person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance”). 
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freedom not to associate.”134 Were it otherwise, expressive and intimate asso-
ciations could not manage their membership and would for that very reason 
cease to be expressive. A group with no control over its membership, after all, 
has little chance of effectively expressing its members’ views.135 And once 
again, it emerges that the affirmative and negative versions of the activity—
association and nonassociation—receive similar protection for the simple rea-
son that they both advance the values of freedom of association: the ability of a 
group to control and express its message to the outside world,136 and to control 
the values and ideals that it cultivates in its members.137 
The association example also highlights an interesting difficulty with the 
very idea of “rights to” and “rights not to.” Given the intertwined relationship 
between association and nonassociation, perhaps there is no difference between 
the two. Perhaps refusal to associate is simply an exercise of the right to asso-
ciate, rather than a derivative right not to. That is, if it is true that the right not 
to associate is necessary to a meaningful right of association, then it might 
make sense to collapse nonassociation back into the “affirmative” right. This is 
in large part an issue of semantics, and it might be a good thing to allow the 
merger for the sake of simplicity. One could read this Article as addressing a 
particular (negative) manner of arms-bearing, for example. And yet association 
and nonassociation are inextricably linked not because they are the same ac-
tion—admitting and rejecting a member of a group are not the same thing, nor 
are speech and silence or carrying and not carrying a gun—but because they 
serve the same constitutional values.  
But of course the Constitution does not protect a generalized right to “au-
tonomy,” nor does it prohibit all government actions that limit people’s ability 
to do as they please or require them to do things they would rather not. More 
specifically, not all “rights to” have corresponding “rights not to,” even if the 
rights themselves can be waived. As the Court has noted, “[t]he ability to waive 
a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the 
opposite of that right.”138 The right to a jury trial,139 for example, is generally 
 
134. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (noting that government actions that could potentially bur-
den the freedom of association include “‘intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an 
association’ like a ‘regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire.’” 
(citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623)). 
135. See, e.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648 (“Forcing a group to accept certain members 
may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it in-
tends to express.”). 
136. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
137. See id. at 618-19 (explaining that intimate associations are protected in part be-
cause “certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions 
of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs”).  
138. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965) (upholding federal rule of crim-
inal procedure requiring government consent in order for criminal defendant to waive right 
to a jury trial). 
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waivable. But that does not mean that a person has a right to proceed without a 
jury.140 Similarly, the right to a speedy trial does not protect a generalized free-
dom to determine the speed of one’s trial,141 nor does the right to a public trial 
“guarantee the right to compel a private trial.”142 
Most courts and scholars have given no sustained attention to the relation-
ship between rights to and rights not to as a general matter, focusing instead on 
specific rights like speech and association. The notable exception is John Gar-
vey, who has argued forcefully and at length that rights should usually be con-
ceptualized as “one-way streets” rather than as “two-way streets”: 
Suppose that it is good to do x. That does not mean that it is good not to do x. 
If freedom follows the good, we should be free to do x. But that does not mean 
that we should be free not to do x. The goodness of religion (or childbearing) 
does not entail the goodness of atheism (or abortion).143 
It follows, Garvey argues, that rights should generally be understood to op-
erate in only one direction—the direction of “the good.” But Garvey himself 
notes that this argument goes against the grain of current constitutional think-
ing, which tends to see rights as bilateral.144 
Perhaps more importantly, even Garvey’s skeptical approach to two-way 
rights turns on whether the values or purposes underlying the right suggest the 
existence of a right not to.145 Under this approach, whether the right to keep 
and bear arms encompasses a right not to keep and bear arms depends on what 
values, purposes, “core,”146 or “central component”147 one attributes to the 
right. This is why the free speech right includes a right not to speak, as Part 
II.A explains, but the right to a speedy trial does not include a right to a slow 
one. The key question, then, is whether and how the purpose of the Second 
Amendment implies a negative right. The next Part addresses that question in 
detail.  
 
139. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
140. Singer, 380 U.S. at 34-35. 
141. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979) (“[A] defendant cannot con-
vert his right to a speedy trial into a right to compel an indefinite postponement . . . .”). 
142. Id. at 382. 
143. GARVEY, supra note 15, at 40. 
144. See id. at 39. 
145. See id. at 18 (“[F]reedoms are not necessarily bilateral. Whether they are or not 
depends on the principles they revolve around.”). 
146. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630, 634 (2008). 
147. Id. at 599 (emphasis omitted). 
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III. THE RIGHT NOT TO KEEP OR BEAR ARMS 
As Part I explained, Heller holds that the central component and core of the 
Second Amendment right is self-defense,148 suggests that the right is especially 
strong in the home, and interprets the words “keep” and “bear” with an aim to-
ward enabling self-defense.149 Part II then set up a question: is that core val-
ue—like the First Amendment values discussed above—furthered by the rec-
ognition of a right not to keep or bear arms? This final Part attempts to provide 
an answer. It first sketches the outlines of a right not to keep or bear arms and 
considers a few of the strongest arguments against it. Parts III.A and III.B con-
sider in more detail the rights not to keep and not to bear, along with some ex-
amples of current laws for which they might be relevant. Part III.C takes a 
broad view of the competing interests at stake. 
A person who keeps a gun in her home for self-defense does so in order to 
enable self-protection against certain kinds of threats to personal safety: crimi-
nals, for example. She has presumably concluded that her home is safer with a 
gun than without one. But many people who refuse to keep guns have come to 
the opposite conclusion based on their assessment of other possible threats to 
personal safety such as misuse, accidental or otherwise, of the gun. Insofar as 
both of these are covered by the broad concept of “self-defense” employed in 
Heller—a contestable proposition, to be sure—both seem to fall within the core 
of the Second Amendment. And if self-defense is the “central component” of 
the Second Amendment right, it seems odd that self-defense decisions should 
only be constitutionally protected when they are effectuated with a gun, rather 
than threatened by one. In either case, the goal of the person making the deci-
sion is to limit a risk of future harm. Indeed, even the affirmative Second 
Amendment right does not directly involve acts of self-defense, but rather the 
freedom to have certain means available to protect oneself against certain kinds 
of harm. Laws that compel people to have guns in their homes simply interfere 
with that decision in a different direction.  
This sketch of the right not to keep or bear arms is subject to a wide range 
of criticisms. The most serious objection is that the decision not to possess 
guns, while perhaps a safety decision, is not an exercise of the right to self-
defense. Traditionally, self-defense generally refers to the use of force in re-
sponse to an immediate threat to personal safety,150 and avoiding the remote 
possibility of a gun’s misuse is not the same kind of “self-defense” as brandish-
ing a weapon against an intruder. This is a strong and deceptively complex ob-
jection, but not necessarily a fatal one.  
 
148. Id. at 599, 630; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 
(2010) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599). 
149. See supra note 6 and sources cited therein. 
150. See, e.g., 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 50 (West 2011) (“As a general rule, 
only a present or imminent danger justifies resort to self defense.” (footnote omitted)). 
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It is true that declining to possess a gun is not a traditional act of self-
defense, unless perhaps it is done under the apprehension of immediate harm—
if a person were to refuse to brandish a gun while visiting the White House, for 
example, on the grounds that doing so might provoke the Secret Service to 
shoot him. Rather, the decision not to keep a gun is a kind of preventative act, 
one intended to lessen the risk of future harm. But in this respect, it is not so 
different from gun ownership itself, which falls within Heller’s “core” even 
though it is not in and of itself an ongoing act of self-defense. In either case, a 
person has made a decision to protect himself against the possibility of future 
harm, whether it be crime or misuse of a gun. The gun owner has determined 
that his chances of safety are maximized if he keeps a gun. His neighbor with-
out a gun has made a different calculation. 
And yet it is possible that having a gun in order to defend oneself against 
burglars should count as self-defense, while the prevention of other forms of 
violence by not keeping or having a gun should not. That is, one must ask 
whether the core purpose of the Second Amendment protects efforts to avoid 
violence by keeping a gun, but does not protect efforts to avoid other forms of 
(perhaps accidental) violence through not having a gun. The answer is not ob-
vious. On the one hand, it cannot be the case that the Second Amendment in-
cludes a generalized right to “personal safety,” which individuals can invoke 
against any government action that makes them feel unsafe. On the other hand, 
subjecting another person to a risk of future violence or other harm—
brandishing a weapon at him or planting potential explosives in his home, for 
example—can give rise to tort or criminal liability.151 Why, then, should efforts 
to avoid such risks and harms not count as self-defense? 
Second Amendment self-defense is not coextensive with “self-defense” as 
that term is used in other areas of law. Its “core” includes actions—keeping a 
gun, for example—that are not themselves acts of self-defense and might never 
even lead to acts of self-defense. Similarly, the Second Amendment has been 
read to extend protection against threats that fall outside the traditional concep-
tion of self-defense. Many scholars believe that Second Amendment self-
defense should include self-defense against not only criminals, but the govern-
ment itself,152 and perhaps even nonhuman threats. At oral argument in Heller, 
Justice Kennedy referred to “the concern of the remote settler to defend himself 
 
151. See id. § 21 (“The crime of reckless endangerment is committed when a defendant 
commits an act that places another in imminent danger of death or serious bodily in-
jury . . . .”); id. § 39 (“If pointing a firearm places the victim in reasonable apprehension of 
receiving bodily injury, the crime of aggravated assault has been committed, regardless of 
whether the gun was loaded.”). 
152. See Williams, supra note 87, at 641 (“It is . . . crystal clear that the Amendment 
was meant to protect the right to keep and bear arms to resist tyranny—as the Heller Court 
itself concedes.”). 
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and his family against hostile Indian tribes and outlaws, wolves and bears and 
grizzlies and things like that.”153 
Since the concept of self-defense lying at the heart of the Second Amend-
ment encompasses decisions about whether arms-bearing will be useful in res-
ponding to threats that are neither present nor imminent, it seems plausible that 
the concept would also cover those risks arising from gun ownership itself. The 
exact scope of these risks is debatable, but not negligible. Some studies show 
that “[a] gun in the home is more likely to be used in a homicide, suicide, or 
unintentional shooting than to be used in self-defense.”154 Others have found 
that “about eight hundred people per year die from unintentional gunshot inju-
ries.”155 According to a 1991 General Accounting Office study, “[f]irearms are 
the fourth leading cause of accidental deaths among children 5 to 14 years old 
and the third leading cause of accidental deaths among 15- to 24-year-olds. 
Across all age groups, accidental shootings are the sixth leading cause of poten-
tial years of life lost because of accidents.”156 And some homeowners might 
believe that keeping guns will make them a target for criminals—half a million 
guns are stolen every year157—or increase the chances that any crime they suf-
fer will turn violent. 
The accuracy and significance of these figures are deeply disputed,158 and 
it is not the purpose of this Article to suggest that they are correct or should be 
persuasive. But as far as the Constitution is concerned, whether a person be-
lieves them or not should presumably be irrelevant—“the Second Amendment 
 
153. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). 
154. See, e.g., Guns in the Home, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/gunviolence/gunsinthehome (click “Overview”) (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2012).  
155. Cook et al., supra note 8, at 1048. The study notes that “this figure is heavily in-
fluenced by coroners’ standards concerning what constitutes an accident as opposed to a 
homicide or suicide.” Id. 
156. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-91-9, ACCIDENTAL SHOOTINGS: 
MANY DEATHS AND INJURIES CAUSED BY FIREARMS COULD BE PREVENTED 2 (1991), availa-
ble at http://161.203.16.4/d20t9/143619.pdf. 
In addition, suicides account for approximately half of all firearm-related deaths, al-
though they often are not central to the gun control debate. Limiting access to guns can argu-
ably reduce the number of impulse suicide attempts, and reduce the fatality of those suicide 
attempts that do occur (thus saving lives, since only ten percent of people who survive a first 
suicide attempt eventually die of suicide). See Matthew Miller & David Hemenway, Guns 
and Suicide in the United States, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 989, 989-91 (2008), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0805923. 
157. Cook et al., supra note 8, at 1047. 
158. See, e.g., GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 149 
tbl.4.4 (1991) (presenting evidence suggesting that people who use guns to resist criminals 
are less likely to be attacked, injured, or robbed); LOTT, supra note 11, at 165. Lott’s conclu-
sions have been heavily criticized. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 11, at 1202. But for the 
purposes of this Article, it does not matter which side of the debate has the better of the evi-
dence—I take for granted the implication of Heller that individuals can decide that question 
for themselves. 
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is meant to constitutionally mandate skepticism about public safety argu-
ments,”159 whether in support of gun ownership or against it. This is precisely 
why the Heller majority explicitly rejected Justice Breyer’s invocation of statis-
tics regarding accidental shootings.160 If the freedom to keep and bear arms 
protects a person’s decision to discount those statistics and conclude that he is 
safer with a gun in the home than without one, then it stands to reason that 
another person should be equally free to believe the statistics and make the op-
posite choice. After all, only a quarter of the adult population owns guns,161 
and only a minority of those who do own guns say they do so for the primary 
purpose of self-defense.162 There are therefore tens and perhaps even hundreds 
of millions of Americans who do not own guns, and according to at least one 
group of scholars, “about two-thirds of gunless adults were actively opposed to 
having guns in their homes because they viewed guns as dangerous, ‘immoral,’ 
or otherwise objectionable.”163 If, as Heller suggests, the “reliance of millions 
of Americans” on the individual rights reading of the Second Amendment is 
relevant to the amendment’s interpretation,164 then it stands to reason that the 
reliance of millions more Americans on the freedom not to keep arms should be 
as well. 
The relationship between self-defense and personal safety in the context of 
the Second Amendment is therefore extremely complicated. If the former is de-
fined at too high a level of generality, then it could encompass all decisions re-
garding personal safety or well-being. The argument here attempts to avoid that 
problem by focusing, as the Second Amendment does, on safety decisions re-
garding “arms,” and by tying the right not to bear arms to the same reasons that 
underlie the affirmative right. That mitigates the problem, but admittedly does 
not address it fully. Rights, after all, are not necessarily coextensive with their 
background justifications. Heller itself found that although “self-defense had 
little to do with the right’s codification[,] it was the central component of the 
right itself.”165 Defining precisely which activities are tied to the background 
justification is no easy task, and it is surely not fully accomplished here. But 
that is a difficulty common to many constitutional rights. Courts and scholars 
 
159. Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of 
the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 131, 147 (2008). 
160. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (“The very enumera-
tion of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Govern-
ment—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting 
upon.”). 
161. Cook et al., supra note 8, at 1045 (“[A]bout 75 percent of all adults do not own 
any guns.”). 
162. Id. at 1047. The most popular reason for gun ownership is recreation. COOK & 
LUDWIG, supra note 9, at 2-3. That purpose fits somewhat awkwardly with the Second 
Amendment right recognized in Heller. 
163. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 9, at 3. 
164. 554 U.S. at 624 n.24. 
165. Id. at 599.  
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often confront the question of what counts as speech, for example, and they 
continue to explore the ramifications of Heller’s self-defense rationale for af-
firmative Second Amendment rights.166 
A second objection would reject the very notion of a Second Amendment 
autonomy right by saying that even if a right to X includes a right to not-X 
where the principles justifying the former also justify the latter, the Second 
Amendment’s own principles do no such thing. One might argue that the pur-
pose of the Second Amendment is to ensure military readiness, or to deter ty-
ranny and crime through the maintenance of an armed citizenry. All of these 
readings would suggest that the Second Amendment right—like that to a jury 
trial—serves a public interest as well as a private one,167 and therefore that its 
value goes beyond its utility for individuals. If that is so, then it might follow 
that the amendment does not include a negative right (and perhaps should not 
even be waivable).  
But this objection is hard to square with Heller and McDonald. As ex-
plained at length in Part I, the Court identified personal self-defense as the core 
and central component of the Second Amendment,168 and defined the terms of 
the amendment in accordance with that interpretation. It seems to follow that 
whatever value arms-bearing has for public purposes like militia service must 
be subordinate to that self-defense purpose. And it is hard to imagine how self-
defense, particularly in the home, serves public values that would override in-
dividual decisionmaking, particularly in light of the Court’s apparent rejection 
of public safety rationales in Heller.169 If public safety is not a sufficient basis 
for limiting the affirmative right, then neither should it be a basis for rejecting 
the negative right. In short, whatever the plausibility of a public value interpre-
tation of personal self-defense, it does not seem consistent with Heller itself. 
The objection does highlight, however, the dependence of the negative right on 
the purpose of its affirmative cousin. If the militia-based reading of the Second 
Amendment had prevailed, no negative right would be apparent, because the 
refusal to keep or bear arms hinders, rather than helps, the purpose of protect-
ing the militia from disarmament. 
A third objection might take a textualist approach, arguing that the Second 
Amendment’s phrasing creates a one-way right: after all, “the First Amendment 
 
166. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal 
Weapons, and the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199 
(2009).  
167. Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a 
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1387 (1984). 
168. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 630; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3036 (2010) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599).  
169. See, e.g., 554 U.S. at 634 (“The very enumeration of the right takes out of the 
hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”); Blocher, supra note 5, 
at 404-11 (describing the Heller majority’s seeming rejection of interest-balancing ap-
proach). 
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guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the decision of 
both what to say and what not to say,”170 while the Second Amendment refers 
only to “the right to keep and bear arms.” It arguably follows that a person can 
defend himself with a gun and gain the Second Amendment’s protection, or 
else defend himself by some other means (by not having a gun, for example) 
and forfeit that constitutional protection. 
This textualist argument has some appeal, but it does not square particular-
ly well with existing constitutional doctrine, which does not determine the exis-
tence of rights to and not to based solely or even primarily on the text alone. 
The Free Exercise Clause, for example, provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.171 That phrasing, like the 
Second Amendment’s, seems to point in only one direction—that of exer-
cise.172 And yet the Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits 
compelled religious activity.173 Without more, it seems difficult to draw a 
bright line between enumerated “freedoms” and “rights.” 
A. The Right Not to “Keep” Arms 
Even if one accepts that the Second Amendment theoretically protects a 
right not to keep arms, it remains to be shown what scope that right should have 
in practice. Because of the symmetry of the constitutional interests involved in 
keeping and not keeping, it makes sense that the right not to keep should, prima 
facie, extend as far as the right to keep. Thus if a particular act of “keeping” is 
constitutionally protected when done voluntarily, it should be constitutionally 
suspect when it is compelled. Having a gun on one’s bedside table, for exam-
ple, would be a constitutionally protected act of “keeping” when done volunta-
rily, and a constitutionally prohibited violation of the right not to keep when it 
is compelled. 
To put it more precisely, the Second Amendment right not to keep guns 
should be coextensive with one’s property-based right to exclude them. Indeed, 
it is that very property right that is limited or taken away by the anti-gun con-
trol laws described in the following Subparts. Were it not for those laws, pri-
vate parties would be free to reach their own arrangements regarding the keep-
ing or bearing of arms. The right to keep guns or not would encompass a zone 
of autonomy in which individuals are free to make either decision, for both in-
volve the same self-defense interests. The Second Amendment would be impli-
 
170. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988). 
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
172. See GARVEY, supra note 15, at 42-44. 
173. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause protects the right to engage in religious activity and also prohibits the government 
from “compel[ling] affirmation of religious belief[s]”). 
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cated only when the government forbids people from keeping or bearing arms 
or forces them to do so. 
Perhaps a hypothetical will be illustrative.174 A handgun is lying on an end 
table in Jon’s living room. Does its presence represent an exercise of Second 
Amendment rights? If Jon owns the gun and placed it there so that it would be 
easily accessible in case of a home invasion, then it is covered by the Heller-
recognized right to armed self-defense in the home. This is true whether or not 
the gun is in Jon’s immediate vicinity at any given time. If he leaves the gun on 
the end table while he goes to the kitchen to make dinner, he is still “keeping” 
it as far as the Second Amendment is concerned. 
Now alter the scenario. The gun on the end table belongs to Jon’s friend 
Brad, who carries it for self-defense and left it on Jon’s living room table while 
the two are eating dinner in Jon’s kitchen. In this scenario, Jon believes that 
guns are dangerous, and that having them in his home imperils his personal 
safety. Holding aside for the moment Jon’s property-based right to exclude 
Brad and his gun,175 what self-defense rights are at work? On the one hand, 
Brad may argue that he is exercising his own Second Amendment rights, and 
that the gun is a mechanism of self-defense for him even when he is “keeping” 
it on Jon’s end table rather than on his own person. That is, after all, the same 
argument that Jon made in the first scenario, and the gun in the second scenario 
is just as accessible to Brad as it is to Jon. But what about Jon? If having a gun 
on his end table counts as “keeping” when he does it voluntarily, why should it 
be anything else when he is forced to do so? The very things that make the gun 
a useful mechanism of self-defense when it is lying on the end table also make 
it the kind of dangerous implement that Jon wants to keep out of his home. 
Jon’s ability to keep himself safe, in other words, is imperiled by the presence 
of the gun in this scenario, just as it was protected in the first one. Why 
shouldn’t he have precisely the same self-defense rights in each scenario? 
There are many ways to distinguish the former scenario from the latter, but 
none is very satisfying. An obvious move is to challenge the very idea of com-
pelled keeping. One might say, for example, that the concept of keeping im-
plies voluntariness, and that it is therefore impossible for a person to be com-
pelled to keep a weapon. Under this approach, Jon is not keeping a gun in the 
second scenario for the simple reason that he has not chosen to do so. But this 
argument is unsatisfactory, just as it would have been unsatisfactory for the Su-
preme Court to have told the Barnette children that speaking is a voluntary act, 
and that they therefore need not worry about their First Amendment rights be-
ing violated by an obligatory pledge. In either situation, the essence of the 
 
174. Because my goal here is simply to illustrate the meanings of keeping and not-
keeping, the hypothetical involves no state action. But as Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C demon-
strate, some incidents of state action implicate the same issues. 
175. This is, of course, the very right limited by the anti-gun control laws discussed be-
low, which is why it must be held aside for now.  
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claim is that individuals have a constitutionally protected right to choose 
whether to engage in the action. It is not enough to define the action in such a 
way as to avoid that claim.  
A more fundamental objection would challenge the concept of compelled 
constructive keeping. In criminal law, constructive possession usually requires 
presence of an object, knowledge of that object, and ability and intent to exer-
cise control over it.176 It is effectively “a legal fiction used by courts to find 
possession in situations where it does not in fact exist, but where they neverthe-
less want an individual to acquire the legal status of a possessor.”177 These 
elements are interrelated—some courts (though by no means a majority) have 
recognized that “proximity of the defendant to a firearm may be a basis for 
conviction of the ‘use’ prong so long as there is some active employment of the 
firearm,”178 and “[w]hen a defendant has exclusive possession of the premises 
on which a firearm is found, knowledge, dominion, and control can be properly 
inferred because of the exclusive possession alone.”179 Questions of construc-
tive possession have already arisen in post-Heller cases, most often where a 
gun owner shares a home with someone who is barred from having a gun—a 
felon, for example. In such cases, the gun owner who is not a felon may be 
wary about being prosecuted for aiding and abetting a felon in possession on 
the theory that the felon with whom he shares a home constructively possesses 
the weapons inside it.180 But one might nonetheless argue that the scenarios 
suggested here involve only the unwanted presence of a gun, not necessarily 
the knowledge of the homeowner who wants to exclude it, and certainly no 
ability to exercise control over it. Therefore, if anything, Jon has suffered a 
trespass, rather than compelled possession.181 
 
176. See Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 129 (D.C. 2001) (referring to drugs). 
177. Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics 
Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751, 761-62 (1972). 
178. United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 1997). Some courts have sug-
gested that proximity, accessibility, or control over the relevant area is sufficient to show 
constructive possession. See Kimberly J. Winbush, What Constitutes “Constructive Posses-
sion” of Unregistered or Otherwise Prohibited Weapon Under State Law, 88 A.L.R.5th 121, 
181-84 (2001) (collecting cases).  
179. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007). 
180. See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 695, 733-34 (2009) (noting that the felon-in-possession ban “goes beyond even 
stripping the convict of the entire core of the right, by pressuring those who share his house-
hold to disarm themselves as well, to avoid the risk of the convict’s being prosecuted for un-
lawful possession based on theories of joint or constructive possession”). 
181. Trespass and compelled possession are not necessarily distinct. After all, “the legal 
directive underlying the tort of trespass enjoins persons from interfering with a possessor’s 
right to exclusive possession,” John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as 
Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945-46 (2010) (emphasis omitted), and some trespasses can 
effectively transform into lawful possession, Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case 
for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2006) (“[A]dverse 
possession can best be understood as a doctrine of efficient trespass.”). To the degree that 
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Certainly, it may be counterintuitive that being denied the right to exclude 
guns from one’s property is the equivalent of being forced to “keep” them. But 
that concern implicates the reach of the right, not its fundamental soundness. It 
seems intuitively correct, for example, that being specifically required to have a 
gun on one’s bedside table constitutes compelled keeping, while living in the 
same apartment building with a gun owner does not. The issue, then, is how 
broadly “not keeping” and “not bearing” should be interpreted, a question tied 
to the Supreme Court’s apparently broad reading of “keep” as “have.” If the af-
firmative Second Amendment right extends to closets, safes, attics, and other 
incidents of nonimmediate possession, then it is not clear why the negative 
right should have a narrower reach, particularly when the right to self-defense 
in the home is implicated either way. After all, if a gun is accessible enough to 
be useful for self-defense, it is almost inevitably accessible enough to pose 
safety risks. The right to determine whether the benefits outweigh the risks is 
the freedom protected by the constitutionalized right to self-defense.182 
Even so, the argument against the concept of compelled constructive keep-
ing is a strong one. And since the intent and knowledge of the gun-opposing 
homeowner both seem relevant (intent and knowledge being elements of con-
structive possession, as noted above), it may be useful to consider them sepa-
rately and in turn. The role of intent is counterintuitive, but not particularly 
complicated. If intent is relevant to compelled constructive possession, what 
should matter is an intent not to keep.183 Although Jon has not demonstrated an 
intent to exercise control over Brad’s gun specifically, he has demonstrated an 
intent (and ability, assuming he knows of the gun and is not legally prohibited 
from removing it) to exclude all guns from his home. Brad’s gun falls within 
that class, and therefore Jon has essentially demonstrated his intent with regard 
to it as well. And even if Jon has not directly manifested an intent not to have 
Brad’s or any other gun in his home—for example, because he does not know 
that a gun has been brought to his home—that does not mean that his posses-
sion, constructive or not, is intentional. Intent, after all, generally requires some 
element of knowledge and willfulness. At best, Jon’s possession is unintention-
al and involuntary, just as it would be if someone slipped a pistol into his coat 
pocket without his knowledge. 
The issue of unknowing possession requires a bit more work. Of course, it 
is worth noting many if not most incidents of compelled keeping are knowing. 
 
trespass and compelled possession shade into one another, the argument here is obviously 
stronger. 
182. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3104 (2010) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“In considering whether to keep a handgun, heads of households must ask them-
selves whether the desired safety benefits outweigh the risks of deliberate or accidental mi-
suse that may result in death or serious injury, not only to residents of the home but to others 
as well.”). 
183. Otherwise, a person could only prove that he was being compelled to possess 
something by demonstrating an intent to possess that thing. 
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The mandatory possession laws described in Subpart A.1 are known, or at least 
easily knowable (constructively known, that is), to homeowners. And the 
“forced entry” parking lot laws described in Subpart A.2 are no secret; busi-
nesses know they are being forced to accept guns on their premises, even if 
they do not know which guns and when.  
It is also easy to imagine laws or even particular cases involving parties 
who have been forced to keep a gun without their knowledge. But even in those 
cases, it seems that the constitutional interests at stake—self-defense in the 
home, primarily—are just as relevant, if not more so, than when the compelled 
possession is knowing. Consider one final variation of the scenario: Jon does 
not know that Brad has brought the gun into his home, perhaps because it was 
concealed in Brad’s coat until he placed it on the end table out of Jon’s sight. 
Are Jon’s self-defense interests any less implicated if he does not know about 
the presence of the gun? It is hard to see how. A person who believes that his 
home is less safe with a gun in it is not likely to be reassured if he is told that 
people are bringing guns into his house without his knowledge. Indeed, inas-
much as the right not to keep or bear is premised on self-defense interests, in-
voluntary and unknowing possession may be an even more serious infringe-
ment of those interests. At least if a person knows that a gun is in his house 
against his wishes, he can take some precautions—sending his children outside, 
for example, or simply confronting the person who brought in the gun and tell-
ing him or her to remove it (assuming, of course, that laws do not forbid him 
from doing the latter).  
In sum, constitutional self-defense interests are implicated whether com-
pelled keeping is actual or constructive, and might actually be heightened when 
the possession is unknowing and involuntary. The idea of compelled keeping 
therefore may not be quite as counterintuitive as it seems. Stated simply: if de-
nying people the ability to bring guns into their homes violates the right to keep 
them, then forcing them to permit guns into their homes violates the right not to 
keep them. In either case, what counts as “keeping” is defined by whether the 
action in question implicates self-protection. If a gun on an end table is accessi-
ble enough to be a useful weapon for self-defense, then it is also accessible 
enough to be used in other ways as well—accidentally, impulsively, unsafely, 
or for any of the other reasons that may have inspired Jon not to voluntarily 
“keep” his own gun. The same conclusion follows for guns stored in base-
ments, attics, outdoor sheds, and the like. The symmetry seems inevitable.184 
 
184. For the sake of that symmetry, I should note that I also believe that knowledge 
should not necessarily be a required element of “affirmative” Second Amendment claims. 
The issue would almost never arise, for the simple reason that—as explained above—
constructive possession convictions typically require knowledge as an essential element. But 
if there were such a thing as a strict liability constructive possession statute, then a person 
prosecuted for possessing a gun she did not know was in her home should be able to chal-
lenge the law on Second Amendment grounds.  
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There is at least one more potential qualification to the idea of compelled 
keeping, one that draws on the difference between keeping and bearing. Put 
simply, how can Jon be “keeping” a gun so long as Brad is actively “bearing” 
it? So long as it remains in Brad’s pocket, how can it ever enter Jon’s posses-
sion? This is a strong argument, but it goes to the reach of the right not to keep 
arms, not its existence. That is, one can recognize Jon’s right not to keep a gun 
and still say that the right is not violated where Brad maintains immediate con-
trol of the gun. Such qualifications would undoubtedly need to be worked out 
in the context of particular cases—does the scenario change when Brad puts 
down the gun? when he leaves it at Jon’s house?—and their resolution will de-
pend largely on how courts define the terms “keep” and “bear.” As noted in 
Part I, that is a task courts and scholars have yet to undertake. 
Undoubtedly, the simplest and most appealing answer to the string of hy-
potheticals above is simply to say that even if Jon has been forced to keep 
Brad’s gun, his constitutional rights have not been violated because there has 
been no state action.185 For precisely the same reason, Jon can tell Brad to keep 
the gun out of his house, and Brad will be without constitutional recourse. This 
is worth emphasizing. Even if one accepts the existence of a right not to keep or 
bear arms, it does not follow that one private party can use that right to force 
another person not to bear arms in her presence, at least not without some 
background right of exclusion. The question in all cases is whether the govern-
ment has infringed the right to avoid having or carrying guns.  
 But as it turns out, a growing number of laws limit and in some cases 
simply forbid private parties from exercising the right to exclude, and thereby 
impair the right not to keep arms. In communities where these laws exist, the 
pendulum of gun control has effectively swung away from where one might 
expect to find it. Rather than limiting people’s ability to have guns, these laws 
limit their ability not to. The government is thus not neutral with regard to gun 
control, allowing individuals to decide for themselves whether to have guns. 
Instead, it has intervened against people who seek to avoid them. 
The following Subparts consider how Second Amendment doctrine might 
evaluate the constitutionality of those burdens in three specific circumstances: 
mandatory possession requirements, “take your gun to work” laws, and con-
cealed carry rights. Together, these laws show a useful spectrum of potential 
infringements on the right not to keep or bear arms. Mandatory possession laws 
infringe the right directly. Laws requiring businesses to allow guns on their 
 
185. I am of course assuming that the Second Amendment, like most constitutional 
guarantees, has a state action requirement. I am also assuming that if a property owner were 
to call on the state’s authority to exclude a gun owner, doing so would not amount to state 
action. But cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that federal court enforcement 
of racially restrictive covenants constituted state action in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause). To the extent that the Second Amendment has no state action requirement, the ar-
gument of this Article would be that much more relevant, for it would raise the constitutional 
stakes of private parties’ efforts to keep guns out of their possession. 
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premises do so indirectly, by stripping private businesses and their owners of 
the right to exclude guns and thereby forcing them to constructively “keep” or 
“have” weapons on their property. And concealed carry laws potentially burden 
(though do not directly infringe) people’s ability to avoid having arms by mak-
ing it harder to know when arms are being brought onto their property in the 
first place.  
Of course, even if these laws or others burden the Second Amendment 
right not to keep or bear arms, it does not necessarily follow that they are un-
constitutional. After all, like the right to speak, the right not to speak has lim-
its;186 it does not give people a First Amendment right not to testify in court, 
for example.187 And just as the affirmative right recognized in Heller and 
McDonald has limits,188 the right not to keep and bear arms would be subject to 
regulations, limitations, and exceptions as well. The argument here is that laws 
burdening the ability to avoid gun possession could give rise to Second 
Amendment claims, not that those claims should necessarily succeed.  
1. Mandatory possession laws 
It may be useful to begin with a set of laws that directly implicate the right 
not to bear arms: those requiring citizens to keep arms. Such mandatory posses-
sion laws are rare, but because they create a straightforward burden on the 
ability not to keep arms, they present a particularly useful illustrative example. 
If the right not to keep arms means anything, surely it must be implicated in 
cases where the government directly requires citizens to keep guns and ammu-
nition in their homes.  
Mandatory gun possession is not widespread, but some communities have 
either proposed or passed laws embracing it. Kennesaw, Georgia, is the most 
famous example—it requires all citizens to keep guns and ammunition in their 
homes.189 Similar laws have been passed in towns in Idaho, Kansas, Pennsyl-
 
186. See Wasserman, supra note 114, at 200. Indeed, some have criticized First 
Amendment doctrine for failing sufficiently to protect the right not to speak. See, e.g., 
BOSMAJIAN, supra note 121, at 14. 
187. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (“Where First Amendment 
rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation[,] resolution of the issue always in-
volves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the 
particular circumstances shown.”). 
188. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (“As noted by the 
38 States that have appeared in this case as amici supporting petitioners, ‘[s]tate and local 
experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second 
Amendment.’” (alteration in original)); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 
(2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
189. KENNESAW, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34-21 (2011), available at 
http://library.municode.com/HTML/12813/level3/PTIICOOR_CH34CIEM_ARTIIFI.html; 
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vania, and Utah.190 Supporters of these laws sometimes say that they are “de-
signed to prevent gun control.”191 Recently, mandatory possession laws have 
played a different political purpose, such as a South Dakota law that would 
force every household in South Dakota to arm itself—an unsubtle jab at the re-
cent health insurance mandate.192  
A supporter of mandatory possession laws might respond that such laws do 
not threaten self-defense or personal safety—in fact, they promote it, since 
widespread gun possession arguably deters crime.193 On this theory, gun own-
ership creates positive externalities for the community. If criminals know that 
many people in an area are armed, they will avoid it altogether, since their 
chances of encountering armed self-defense are that much higher.194 Holding 
aside the accuracy and relevance of the assumptions underlying this argument, 
mandatory possession laws raise constitutional difficulties for precisely the 
same reason as compelled subsidization in First Amendment doctrine. “The ba-
sic idea of the compelled subsidization doctrine,” after all, “is that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from requiring some individuals to sub-
sidize the First Amendment activities of others.”195 If I have a right not to bear 
arms, why should I be forced to subsidize others’ self-defense interests at the 
expense of my own? If the government can infringe the right not to bear arms 
by deciding that the community is safer with universal gun ownership, then 
why can’t it infringe the right to bear arms by deciding the opposite and ab-
 
Anna Fifield, Kennesaw, Where Everyone is Armed by Law, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/5c1b6a72-c5eb-11df-b53e-00144feab49a.html#axzz16d4dQ5T3.  
190. See Kansas Community Requires Households to Have Guns, USA TODAY (Nov. 
23, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-11-23-kansas-guns_x.htm; Glenn 
Reynolds, A Rifle in Every Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at A21; Town in Utah Requires 
Owning Guns, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 1994), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
US/story?id=95092&page=1; see also Joanna Mareth, Vermont’s Right Not to Bear Arms, 
AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 27, 2000), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=vermonts 
_right_not_to_bear_arms (describing similar bill proposed in Vermont). 
191. Town Considering Repeal of Ordinance on Gun Ownership, TIMES-UNION (War-
saw, Ind.), Mar. 1, 1994, at 7A, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=4Mk 
_AAAAIBAJ&sjid=FVgMAAAAIBAJ&pg=5663,57144&dq=mandatory+gun+ownership 
&hl=en (referring to law in Franklintown, Pennsylvania). 
192. See Caitlin Dickson, S. Dakota Proposes Mandatory Gun Ownership to Prove 
Point, ATLANTIC WIRE (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011/02/      
s-dakota-proposes-mandatory-gun-ownership-to-prove-point/17861. 
193. See generally LOTT, supra note 11. 
194. For a similar argument, see Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Ex-
ternalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 43, 74-75 (1998), available at http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/            
LevittAyres1998.pdf (arguing that private ownership of a “Lojack” tracking system not only 
protects individual cars from theft, but contributes to an overall lowering of the rate of car 
theft). 
195. Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2005); see, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). 
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olishing guns altogether? Either decision implicates Second Amendment 
rights—in the latter case, those of individuals who wish to own guns for self-
defense; in the former, those of individuals who want to keep their homes safe 
by excluding guns. 
Of course, none of this means that compelled keeping laws are per se un-
constitutional, only that they raise Second Amendment problems. One might 
defend the laws on the ground that they are unlikely ever to be enforced. No 
one has ever been prosecuted for violating the Kennesaw law, for example.196 
So long as the laws are strictly symbolic and people are not actually threatened 
with punishment for failing to keep guns in their homes, one could argue that 
the right to defend oneself by not possessing weapons has not been infringed. 
The District of Columbia unsuccessfully made a similar argument in Heller, 
defending its safe storage requirement in part by arguing that it had never been 
enforced against a person unlocking his or her weapon for use in self-
defense.197 The District, joined by the U.S. Solicitor General, suggested that 
the law should be read—like other laws of general applicability—as having an 
implicit self-defense exception.198 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this 
argument, striking down the law because it did not contain an explicit self-
defense exception.199 The same reasoning would seem to apply to compelled 
keeping laws. Following the Heller approach, such laws should be unconstitu-
tional to the extent that they require people to “keep” arms against their own 
self-defense interests, even if the laws themselves are not enforced. 
This leads to a second possible defense of the gun-keeping laws, which is 
that some of them—the Kennesaw law included200—contain a “conscientious 
objector” exception. If this exception is broad enough to exempt those who ob-
ject to the law on self-defense grounds, then it may indeed head off Second 
Amendment objections. Of course, if the exception is read that broadly, then 
the law itself may be without much practical effect, since a large majority of 
Americans—though perhaps not a majority within the communities that pass 
compelled keeping laws—choose not to possess guns for self-defense. On the 
other hand, if the law exempts only those conscientious objectors who oppose 
gun ownership for religious or ethical reasons, then it is probably not broad 
 
196. Fifield, supra note 189. 
197. See Brief for Petitioners at 8, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) 
(No. 07-290), 2008 WL 102223. 
198. See id. at 56; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 31 n.8, Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157201. 
199. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (2008); see also id. at 692 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am 
puzzled by the majority’s unwillingness to adopt a similar approach [to that suggested by the 
District]. It readily reads unspoken self-defense exceptions into every colonial law, but it 
refuses to accept the District’s concession that this law has one.”). 
200. See Fifield, supra note 189. This exception seems to have been added in response 
to an ACLU lawsuit. See Michael Hirsley, Kennesaw Wins First Gun-Law Shootout, CHI. 
TRIB., Aug. 1, 1982, at B8.  
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enough to protect the constitutional self-defense rights of those whose opposi-
tion to gun ownership is grounded in safety concerns. 
Finally, one might defend compelled keeping laws by appealing to histori-
cal precedent, especially the Militia Acts of 1792, which provided that “every 
citizen so enrolled [in the militia] and notified, shall, within six months thereaf-
ter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and 
belt,” various other accoutrements, “or with a good rifle, knapsack,” and am-
munition, “and shall appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out 
to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out on company days to 
exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack.”201 If the Framers counte-
nanced such a law, which effectively required people to keep arms, why should 
mandatory possession laws be unconstitutional today? 
This is a strong argument, but there are a few ways to answer it. First, the 
Militia Acts only applied to people who were enrolled in the militia. It was 
more akin to a draft than to a general law requiring keeping of arms. As such, it 
arguably constituted a permissible regulation of the right not to keep or bear 
arms, rather than a refutation of its existence. As explained in more detail be-
low, even a robust right not to keep or bear arms would not prevent compulsory 
military service any more than the right not to speak prohibits compelled 
speech in military contexts. Second, many constitutional rights are interpreted 
in ways that would be hard to square with the content of Founding-era legisla-
tive enactments. Modern First Amendment doctrine, for example, would of 
course not countenance a law banning criticism of the government, despite the 
fact that the Alien and Sedition Acts did exactly that in 1798.202 Finally, the 
Militia Acts are somewhat hard to square with the holding of Heller itself. Hel-
ler, after all, concluded that the Second Amendment “elevates above all other 
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home.”203 As their names imply, the Militia Acts focused on a dif-
ferent set of interests—the militias, rather than the self-defense interests that 
Heller and McDonald identified as the core and central component of the 
Second Amendment.204 It would be unsatisfying, to say the least, if the gov-
ernment could infringe those self-defense rights in the name of an Act whose 
 
201. Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271, repealed by Dick Act of 
1903, ch. 196, § 25, 32 Stat. 775, 780. 
202.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 626 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Ten 
years after proposing the First Amendment, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
measures patently unconstitutional by modern standards. If the early Congress’s political 
actions were determinative, and not merely relevant, evidence of constitutional meaning, we 
would have to gut our current First Amendment doctrine to make room for political censor-
ship.”). 
203. 554 U.S. at 635. 
204. See id. at 599, 630; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 
(2010) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599).  
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very name invokes the Second Amendment interpretation the Court rejected in 
Heller. 
2. Laws forbidding the exclusion of guns from private property 
Not all infringements of the right not to keep arms are quite so direct as 
mandatory possession laws. A growing number of states have passed what are 
variously referred to as “take your gun to work,” “parking lot,” or “forced en-
try” laws. These forbid businesses and occasionally other private entities from 
banning guns on their premises, or at least require them to permit guns to be 
stored in cars in their parking lots. Though this imposition may not be as direct 
as the mandatory possession laws discussed above, it does burden the ability of 
private parties not to keep arms, and thereby implicates the Second Amendment 
rights described here. 
At least eleven states have passed laws limiting businesses’ authority to 
exclude guns from their premises.205 Most of these laws focus on parking 
lots,206 but their language is not always so limited. As the Tenth Circuit noted 
in a decision rejecting a constitutional challenge to Oklahoma’s law, such laws 
“hold employers criminally liable for prohibiting employees from storing fire-
arms in locked vehicles on company property.”207 Oklahoma’s law, generally 
recognized as a pioneer, makes it illegal for any “person, property owner, te-
nant, employer, or business entity” to bar any person besides a convicted felon 
from bringing a gun onto “property set aside for any motor vehicle.”208 Flori-
da’s law, later struck down in part on unrelated grounds, prohibited an employ-
er from “discriminat[ing]” against a worker or customer “for exercising his or 
her constitutional right to keep and bear arms or for exercising the right of self-
defense as long as a firearm is never exhibited on company property for any 
reason other than lawful defensive purposes.”209  
Since most of these laws apply to businesses, one important threshold 
question is whether businesses have Second Amendment rights. Heller and 
McDonald did not confront this question, but it is nonetheless possible to ex-
 
205. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800 (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (2011); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251 (West 2011), invalidated in part by Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. At-
torney Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1303 (N.D. Fla. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135 
(2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c11 (2009) 
(repealed 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
32:292.1 (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55 
(2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.7a (2011). Some of these laws (for example, Florida’s 
and Kansas’s), however, are no longer valid. 
206. See generally Stefanie L. Steines, Parking-Lot Laws: An Assault on Private-
Property Rights and Workplace Safety, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1171 (2008). 
207. Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
challenges on takings, preemption, due process, and vagueness grounds).  
208. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.7a. 
209. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251(4)(e). 
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plore the preliminary contours of an answer.210 Sole proprietorships and the 
like presumably do, since they are effectively indistinguishable from the indi-
viduals who own them. For other business entities, the answer is less clear. 
Nevertheless, if a law were to ban guns at businesses, those businesses would 
likely have standing to raise a Second Amendment challenge based on the self-
defense interests of their employees and customers. The reverse, then, should 
be equally true—businesses should be able to challenge laws requiring them to 
permit guns on their premises if they believe that guns imperil the safety of 
workers and customers. As a businessman in Florida put it, “Our company has 
the right to make the rules. Same as in your house. You may tell people that 
come to visit you they are not allowed to bring a firearm in the house.”211 And 
just like homeowners, businesses face difficult problems of gun violence on 
their property. One recent study found that businesses that allow firearms on 
their premises are about five times more likely to be the site of a homicide.212 
Requiring guns to be stored in a parking lot may not be enough to prevent such 
violence.213 
But even if the right not to keep arms exists and businesses can invoke it, 
that does not necessarily mean that laws requiring businesses to allow the pos-
session of arms on their property violate the right. Arguably, such laws are ne-
cessary to protect the rights of individuals who wish to exercise a right to 
armed self-defense, and are thus in some sense grounded in the Second 
Amendment’s core value of self-defense. In order to keep themselves safe, per-
haps people need to carry guns to or from the offices and businesses where they 
work and shop—to protect themselves in a dark parking lot, or from an abusive 
coworker, or from having a major purchase stolen before it can be transported 
 
210. The Second Amendment rights of corporations are addressed in greater detail in 
Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate 
Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011).  
211. Mark Strassmann, Take Your Gun to Work? Two States Say Yes, CBS NEWS (Feb. 
11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/27/eveningnews/main4297999.shtml; 
see also Editorial, Competing Rights, VALLEY MORNING STAR, Aug. 23, 2005, available at 
2005 WLNR 13266506 (“[I]t’s the company’s property, so it gets to set the rules.”); The 
NRA Should Hold Its Fire, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 15, 2005, at 102 (“[E]mployers . . . must 
also have the freedom to set rules to ensure their workers’ safety while on their premises.”). 
212. Dana Loomis et al., Employer Policies Toward Guns and the Risk of Homicide in 
the Workplace, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 830, 830 (2005); see also BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT 
GUN VIOLENCE, FORCED ENTRY 1, 6-8 (2005), available at http://dev.bradycenter.org/ 
xshare/pdf/reports/forced-entry-report.pdf (noting other statistics on gun-related injuries and 
fatalities); Steines, supra note 206, at 1173 (same). 
213. See, e.g., Wyatt Buchanan, Man Sought in Fatal Shooting in Parking Lot, S.F. 
CHRON., Nov. 6, 2004, at B2, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-11-06/bay-area/ 
17453418_1_parking-lot-accidental-shooting-business-parking (describing fatal shooting in 
a business parking lot after work hours); Ryan Lenz, Worker Kills 5, Himself After Fight 
with Boss, DESERET NEWS (June 26, 2008), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700238000/ 
Worker-kills-5-himself-after-fight-with-boss.html (describing case in which an employee, 
after a dispute with his supervisor, retrieved a .45 caliber pistol from his car and killed five 
other employees and himself). 
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home. Threats to personal safety do not end—in fact, may begin—outside the 
home. 
For this counterargument to succeed as a constitutional matter, however, it 
must be the case that businesses (some of them, anyway) are bound by the 
Second Amendment, just as the company town in Marsh v. Alabama was 
bound by the First Amendment.214 In other words, perhaps the Second 
Amendment, standing alone, abridges private property rights in the name of the 
constitutional right to armed self-defense.215 Such an argument—that the 
Second Amendment requires businesses to permit private possession—would 
be based implicitly on the notion that some businesses are effectively “public 
self-defense forums.”216 Whether or not the analogy holds up is a question for 
another paper, though it is worth noting that the Court has progressively moved 
away from Marsh in its First Amendment jurisprudence.217 And even assuming 
that the analogy does hold, it would not necessarily demonstrate the constitu-
tionality of laws requiring businesses to permit guns on their premises. Such 
laws would be both unnecessary (because the Second Amendment itself would 
guarantee such rights) and overbroad (because they would sweep in many busi-
nesses that do not meet the “public self-defense forum” standard). 
The First Amendment analogy is nonetheless useful, because the Court has 
often grappled with situations in which the free speech interests of individuals 
come into conflict with those of business owners—the same kind of conflict 
that arises with self-defense interests in the Second Amendment context. And 
where the Court has found that the First Amendment interests of the business 
(i.e., in avoiding misattributed speech) are not sufficiently implicated as a prac-
tical matter, it has rejected compelled speech claims and upheld government 
 
214. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946); see also PruneYard Shop-
ping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980) (holding that private property owner could 
not bar individuals from his shopping center on the basis of their speech).  
215. Cf. Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
a constitutional challenge to Oklahoma’s parking lot law and holding that “[a]s in Pru-
neYard, Plaintiffs have not suffered an unconstitutional infringement of their property rights, 
but rather are required by the Amendments to recognize a state-protected right of their em-
ployees”). 
216. Some gun rights advocates have implicitly embraced this notion, accusing private 
actors of violating the Second Amendment by forbidding guns on their property. See, e.g., 
Jessica Marquez, Employers Fire Back at Law Making It a Felony to Ban Guns on Company 
Premises, WORKFORCE MGMT., Jan. 30, 2006, at 34 (quoting former NRA president Marion 
Hammer as saying, “We have employers violating the constitutional rights of their em-
ployees”); Louise Red Corn, NRA to Boycott Companies, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 2, 2005, at 
A9 (quoting NRA chief executive Wayne LaPierre as saying, “We’re going to make Con-
ocoPhillips the example of what happens when a corporation takes away your Second 
Amendment rights”). 
217. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the 
Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1565 (2008) (noting that the Supreme Court “has 
sharply constrained the reach of the constitutional theory” underlying the Marsh line of cas-
es). 
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interventions. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, for example, the Court 
distinguished Wooley and rejected a shopping mall owner’s claim that a Cali-
fornia law requiring him to permit protestors into the mall violated his own 
First Amendment right to avoid compelled speech: 
The views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or 
seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of 
the owner. . . . [A]s far as appears here appellants can expressly disavow any 
connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the 
speakers or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any 
sponsorship of the message and could explain that the persons are communi-
cating their own messages by virtue of state law.218 
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC, which upheld the FCC’s “must-carry” provisions because “there 
appears little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations 
carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable op-
erator.”219 In PruneYard and Turner, then, the Court rejected compelled speech 
claims because it found that, as a practical matter, no speech had been com-
pelled.  
But although the compulsion claims failed in PruneYard and Turner, simi-
lar claims should succeed in cases involving firearms for the simple reason that 
the latter cases implicate a relevant constitutional interest, while the former do 
not. In the free speech context, misattribution is the relevant harm, and thus 
constitutional concerns dissipate when no misattribution exists. In the Second 
Amendment context, however, involuntary possession of the weapon—not mi-
sattribution of possession—is the harm, because it raises the risk of an acciden-
tal or other unwanted shooting. Whether third parties would consider an em-
ployee’s possession of a gun to be an exercise of his right to self-defense or that 
of the company is simply not relevant to that self-defense interest. And given 
that, in the First Amendment context, the Court has concluded that it must also 
“give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expres-
sion,”220 it seems plausible that, in the Second Amendment context, courts 
should be deferential to businesses’ and other private entities’ conclusions 
about whether guns on their property promote or detract from safety.  
But of course right-not-to-associate claims do not always succeed, and it 
might well be that by opening themselves up to the public, businesses lose their 
right to exclude gun carriers. I do not hazard a guess as to whether courts will 
find that forcing businesses to allow guns on their premises violates the busi-
nesses’ Second Amendment self-defense rights. The point is simply that if a 
business or other private entity determines that its premises are safest when 
guns are excluded, then that decision should be entitled to the same degree of 
 
218. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87. 
219. 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994). 
220. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). 
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deference and Second Amendment protection as the decision to permit gun 
possession.  
3. Concealed carry laws 
The final category of laws that arguably infringe the right not to keep arms 
does so much less directly. This category consists of laws that permit the con-
cealed carrying of firearms. To precisely the same degree that these laws make 
it possible for gun owners to hide their weapons, they also make it hard for oth-
er individuals to monitor whether guns are being brought onto their property or 
into their homes and thereby into their constructive possession. Accordingly, 
concealed carry laws burden—although do not forbid—the exercise of the right 
not to keep arms.221 This of course does not make them unconstitutional; it 
simply shows that concealed carry laws affect the self-defense interests not on-
ly of those who wish to carry guns, but also of those who wish to avoid keeping 
them. 
Whereas it was once considered “cowardly” to carry concealed wea-
pons,222 today mandatory (i.e., “shall-issue”) concealed carry permits are de-
fended as being “based on a simple principle: the right of self-defense.”223 As 
David Kopel notes, “In the nineteenth century, concealed carry was often con-
sidered outside the scope of the right to bear arms. Today, it is the most com-
mon way in which people exercise their right to bear arms.”224 It is perhaps un-
surprising, then, that legislatures have responded by passing concealed carry 
laws. Today most states have some version of a “shall-issue” statute, which are 
known as such because they require officials to issue a concealed carry permit 
to anyone who meets basic requirements such as not having a criminal record 
or mental illness.225  
 
221. Of course, the absence of a law permitting concealed carry does not necessarily 
mean that people will carry their arms openly. But the argument here is not that the govern-
ment must ensure that people are able keep guns out of their homes, only that laws which 
make it even harder to do so may raise Second Amendment problems. Many thanks to Bran-
non Denning for pointing this out.  
222. See Cornell, supra note 46, at 585 (quoting articles in the Cleveland Morning 
Leader and the Cincinnati Daily Times from April 1859, which applauded the Ohio General 
Assembly for “very properly pass[ing] a law to punish the carrying of concealed weapons in 
this State, a most cowardly as well as murderous practice”); see also State v. Chandler, 5 La. 
Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (stating that the right to bear arms is “calculated to incite men to a 
manly and noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their country, without any ten-
dency to secret advantages and unmanly assassinations”). 
223. Jeffrey R. Snyder, Fighting Back: Crime, Self-Defense, and the Right to Carry a 
Handgun, CATO INST. (Oct. 22, 1997), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1143. 
224. David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 99, 126, cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/content/denovo/kopel_2010 
_99.pdf. 
225. See Steven W. Kranz, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes, 29 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 638, 649-52 (2006) (describing typical elements of shall-issue statutes).  
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Whether or not such laws are wise policy is far beyond the scope and irre-
levant to the thesis of this Article. For present purposes, what matters is that 
concealed carry laws make it more difficult for private parties to keep guns out 
of their homes and off their property. That this is so as a practical matter is not 
hard to discern. If a person shows up at my door bearing arms openly, I can de-
cide whether to welcome him as he is, slam the door, offer him ammunition, 
tell him that he must leave his gun in his own home, or explain that he must un-
load and store it safely while he is in mine. All of these are perfectly constitu-
tional exercises of my property rights. If, however, that same person shows up 
with a gun concealed inside his coat, I may never know that a gun has entered 
my home, and thus will not be able to exercise my right to exclude it and him. 
That does not make it impossible for me to keep guns out of my home—I can 
simply ask my guests whether they are bearing guns, and either trust their an-
swers or pat them down—but it does make it more difficult. By practically li-
miting people’s ability to keep guns out of their homes, concealed carry laws 
thereby burden their right to do so. 
Of course, this in and of itself is not enough to demonstrate that concealed 
carry laws are unconstitutional. First, it could be argued that concealed carry 
licenses are not even a true form of state action favoring gun owners. If such 
laws did not exist, then concealed carry would presumably be permissible by 
default. And yet this seems to go too far, since concealed carry licenses do have 
the effect of immunizing concealed carrying individuals from criminal or civil 
liability. In that sense, they constitute state action just like any other licensing 
system.226 Moreover, the government’s explicit approval of concealed weapons 
may change social norms about when and where it is proper to carry them.227 
In that sense, the state action may have a direct impact on private ordering. 
Second, concealed carry laws do not directly forbid homeowners from ask-
ing visitors whether they are armed or even frisking them prior to entry. The 
state’s allowance for concealed carry is therefore at most an incidental burden 
on the right not to keep or bear arms. As noted above, constitutional rights are 
 
226. This draws some indirect support from the fact that the Supreme Court has routine-
ly held that licensing systems can be invalidated for impinging on constitutional rights. See, 
e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 (1948) (finding permit requirement unconstitu-
tional because it imposed an “effective previous restraint” on liberty); Largent v. Texas, 318 
U.S. 418, 422 (1943) (finding license requirement amounted to censorship); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-06 (1940) (suggesting that license requirements place re-
straints on behavior and such restraints constitute state action). 
227. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 397-98 (1997) (“[T]he law can strengthen a norm merely by 
‘expressing’ it, without providing any enforcement.”); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 
109-10 (1999) (explaining how expansion of intellectual property rights in law created new 
social norms in the scientific community). 
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subject to regulations,228 particularly incidental ones,229 and it may well be that 
concealed carry laws are just such a constitutionally permissible burden. 
Whether such laws should be upheld depends on what standard of review is ap-
plicable to the right not to bear arms. And that, in turn, will depend on what 
standard of review emerges for evaluating more traditional Second Amendment 
claims, a question left open by Heller and McDonald.230 So, too, does it remain 
to be shown whether incidental burdens on Second Amendment rights, whether 
of the affirmative or negative variety, should be treated the same as direct regu-
lations. 
Perhaps the right not to keep arms is not infringed even when a gun is 
brought onto a person’s property, so long as that gun remains in the immediate 
possession of (i.e., is borne by) another person. So long as an armed visitor 
does not put her gun down or leave it lying around the house where someone 
could put it to bad use, the argument would go, the danger of an accidental or 
unwanted shooting is low and the homeowner’s safety is not at risk. But this 
line of reasoning is unlikely to satisfy a homeowner who is wary of gun vi-
olence. After all, accidental shootings by or of children and other family mem-
bers are not the only dangers a person may be seeking to prevent by keeping 
guns out of his home. Maybe even more dangerous—because less controlla-
ble—are the risks presented by armed visitors, even well-intentioned ones. If 
the visitor has brought a loaded gun, secured only by a holster or in a coat 
pocket, it may create an even more imminent danger than a gun kept unloaded, 
locked, or stored in a safe. If a person believes that a gun is too dangerous to 
have in the house even when he has control over its storage, he will almost cer-
tainly be just as strongly opposed to having others bear their weapons in his 
home. 
Perhaps instead we must take into account the constitutional interests of the 
person doing the concealed carrying. It might be argued that concealed carry 
laws are simply a necessary part of protecting individuals’ right to “bear.” But 
it would be somewhat odd if the Second Amendment were to impose such af-
firmative burdens on the state. The heart of our constitutional rights tradition, 
 
228. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (holding that “[t]he law is 
perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as 
the Bill of Rights,” embody principles which have “from time immemorial been subject to 
certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case”); see also supra 
notes 186-88 and accompanying text. 
229. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1175, 1179, 1181 (1996) (arguing that even “incidental burdens [should] be treated as 
real infringements of rights” and that a “substantiality threshold ought to apply to incidental 
and facilitative direct burdens, but not to purposeful ones”). 
230. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which 
Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
85 (2010) (debating “the standard of scrutiny that the Supreme Court should apply to restric-
tions on the Second Amendment in the wake of its recent decision, McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago”). 
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after all, is the notion that the government must refrain from involvement in 
certain rights-related areas, not that it must involve itself. This is particularly 
salient in the context of concealed carry rules, since there is a long American 
tradition of regulating concealed weapons.231 That does not mean that govern-
ment must continue to do so, only that self-defense interests are implicated 
whether or not it does. 
Concealed carry laws illustrate how a person’s ability to exclude guns from 
his or her home can be burdened by state actions favoring gun owners. But as 
this discussion has attempted to demonstrate, that does not make them uncons-
titutional. 
B. The Right Not to “Bear” Arms 
If the right to bear arms means, as Heller found, the right to “carry” them, 
then the right not to bear arms means the right not to carry them. That right is 
more intuitively robust than the right not to keep—compelled carry rules surely 
strike most people as unconstitutional, at least outside of military contexts—but 
would have fewer, if any, practical implications.  
The right not to bear arms has something of a historical lineage: the “con-
scientious objector” exceptions to the Second Amendment proposed during the 
Founding era. The Virginia and North Carolina proposals, which are represent-
ative, provided that “any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to 
be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in 
his stead.”232 States frequently wrote such protections into their own constitu-
tions. In 1868, seventeen states “had clauses that expressly prohibited compel-
ling people who are conscientiously (or otherwise) opposed to bearing arms 
from being . . . drafted into militia duty.”233 
These conscientious objector exceptions have typically been presented as 
evidence that the Second Amendment is concerned with militias, since it would 
have made little sense to contemplate a constitutional exemption for people 
who did not wish to use arms for self-defense.234 Of course, Heller rejected that 
argument and concluded instead that to “bear” a gun meant to carry it for pur-
 
231. See Cornell, supra note 46, at 584-85. 
232. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 17, 
19 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (Virginia proposal); 4 DEBATES, supra note 80, at 244 
(North Carolina proposal); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 590 n.13 
(2008) (citing both proposals). 
233. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitu-
tions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply 
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 54 (2008). 
234. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is no plausible argu-
ment that the use of ‘bear arms’ in those provisions was not unequivocally and exclusively 
military: The State simply does not compel its citizens to carry arms for the purpose of pri-
vate ‘confrontation’ or for self-defense.” (citation omitted)). 
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poses of “confrontation.”235 And in finding that the core of the Second 
Amendment was the right to self-defense, the majority pointed to evidence ar-
guably showing that the conscientious objector exemptions were in fact focused 
on self-defense, since “Quakers opposed the use of arms not just for militia ser-
vice, but for any violent purpose whatsoever.”236 This might be read to suggest 
that the rejection of the conscientious objector exemptions indicates that people 
can be forced to carry guns for self-defense purposes. That is, if the Framers 
understood that Quakers were “religiously scrupulous of bearing arms” even in 
their own self-defense, and yet rejected a provision that would have exempted 
them from doing so, then perhaps the people can be compelled to bear arms for 
self-defense purposes. 
But emphasizing the self-defense purposes of the Second Amendment 
gives “conscientious objectors”—those who refuse to carry guns, whether in a 
militia or, as Heller suggests, in self-defense—a stronger constitutional claim 
when it comes to not bearing arms. At the time of the Founding, exemptions 
were opposed most strenuously by those who claimed that people who refused 
to bear arms (in the militia context, of course) were falling short in their obliga-
tions to society. Representative William Giles of Virginia, for example, op-
posed the exemption for Quakers on the grounds that “[p]ersonal service . . . 
was a debt every member owed to the protection of government, a debt which it 
was immoral not to pay.”237 Reviewing Founding-era materials, Nathan Ko-
zuskanich concludes that “[b]earing arms for the state was an obligation for 
every man who enjoyed the protections of the state.”238 Refusing to bear arms 
in service of the state, then, meant abdicating a duty and imposing costs on oth-
ers. 
Those who object to the use of arms in self-defense, by contrast, do not 
impose the same costs on the rest of society. Of course, one could argue that by 
bearing arms against criminals, each gun-bearing citizen helps to deter crime by 
raising the expected cost of crime for would-be criminals.239 But whatever the 
policy considerations involved, surely the positive externalities of gun owner-
ship are not sufficiently high to justify abrogation of the right not to bear, at 
least not any more so than negative externalities can justify prohibitions on 
bearing. 
 
235. Id. at 584 (majority opinion). It is slightly unclear what purposes are excluded by 
this definition, though it would seem that possession of guns for hunting and target shooting 
have no constitutional protection, since they do not involve “confrontation.” Cf. COOK & 
LUDWIG, supra note 9, at 2-3 (noting that “recreation” is the most common reason for gun 
ownership). 
236. 554 U.S. at 590. 
237. Kozuskanich, supra note 48, at 432 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting 
Sketch of the Debates on Part of the Militia Bill, supra note 48, at 2). 
238. Id. at 428.  
239. Cf. LOTT, supra note 11, at 5.  
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In any event, even if the right not to bear arms exists and extends beyond 
conscientious objection to military service, it has little practical importance, for 
the government rarely forces citizens to carry arms.240 Today, the most likely 
incident of forced arms-bearing is the military draft. Citizens who are con-
scripted into military service are obligated by state action to “bear arms” at 
immense cost to their own safety. If the Second Amendment protects a consti-
tutional right to defend one’s safety by not bearing arms, can these soldiers 
raise constitutional arguments and thereby avoid compulsory military service? 
Yes, and no. The draft undoubtedly impinges on the right to defend one’s 
self by avoiding arms-bearing. But it does not follow that service members can 
refuse to carry guns by invoking the Second Amendment, any more than they 
can invoke their “affirmative” Second Amendment rights by bringing their own 
guns to war, or refuse to salute their commanders because doing so would 
amount to compelled speech. The draft implicates a wide array of constitutional 
rights, including free speech,241 involuntary servitude,242 and equal protec-
tion,243 but the Supreme Court has rejected constitutional challenges on these 
and other grounds. The same result would—and should—obtain if someone 
were to assert his right not to bear arms.  
C. Mediating Conflicting Rights 
Recognizing a Second Amendment right not to keep or bear arms would 
not create a constitutional trump card—it would not automatically invalidate all 
state actions that burden one’s ability to avoid guns. It would, however, mean 
recognizing that laws facilitating some people’s ability to bear arms may at 
times conflict with the right of others not to.  
This might seem more troubling than illuminating. If I have a right not to 
keep arms, and that right can be violated when other people carry guns in my 
proximity (or at least on my property), what is to prevent the Second Amend-
ment from being paralyzed by constant self-contradiction? Will the right not to 
keep be in continual conflict with the right to bear? But in fact there is no rea-
son why this would be true, at least not any more so than the First Amend-
ment’s rights to speak and not speak have cancelled each other out. The reason, 
 
240. This has not always been true. See Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1172, 1184 (2010) (citing, inter alia, Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 
271, 271, repealed by Dick Act of 1903, ch. 196, § 25, 32 Stat. 775, 780; Statute of Win-
chester, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, cc. 1, 4 (Eng.); Assize of Arms, 1181, 27 Hen. 2 (Eng.)). 
241. See generally Emily Reuter, Second Class Citizen Soldiers: A Proposal for Great-
er First Amendment Protections for America’s Military Personnel, 16 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 315 (2007). 
242. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 373 (1918) (rejecting a Thirteenth 
Amendment challenge to the conscription law). 
243. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding gender discrimination 
in draft registration). 
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simply stated, is that constitutional rights generally run only against the gov-
ernment. As a result, no one could invoke the right not to keep or bear arms 
against a neighbor any more than he could claim First Amendment rights 
against him. For the same reason, no one could assert a Second Amendment 
right to bear arms on other people’s private property. 
It could nevertheless be argued that using one person’s desire to avoid 
keeping arms as a justification for limiting another person’s ability to bear them 
amounts to nothing more than the Second Amendment equivalent of a “heck-
ler’s veto.” In First Amendment doctrine, after all, the government is not per-
mitted to regulate speech based simply on the fact that the speech offends oth-
ers.244 If the right not to keep or bear arms prevents the government from 
passing concealed carry laws or requiring businesses to permit carrying arms 
on their premises, wouldn’t that mean allowing some citizens’ objections to 
trump others’ rights? Not quite. The heckler’s veto cases involve government 
action—the state-imposed limitation of one person’s right to speak simply be-
cause others object. The argument here, by contrast, is that the government may 
not force objectors to engage in the constitutionally protected conduct they op-
pose, not that the government can use their opposition to prevent others from 
doing so. There is a difference between saying that the government has no con-
stitutional authority to force people to “keep” guns in their home and saying 
that the government has authority to limit others’ right to bear them as they 
please.  
A third version of the argument would be that recognizing a right not to 
keep and bear arms would effectively nullify the right to keep and bear them, 
because the right to armed self-defense will be rendered ineffectual if people 
cannot bear their guns in public and even occasionally on private property. 
Without laws supporting concealed carry and requiring businesses or other es-
tablishments to permit guns on their premises, gun-rights supporters might ar-
gue, the right itself is worthless. The most obvious answer to this objection is 
“So what?” It would be a strange constitutional right that required the govern-
ment to pass laws encouraging its effectuation, particularly at the expense of 
other private parties invoking the same right. The First Amendment, for exam-
ple, places no obligations on the government to require one private party to 
help another speak. Indeed, it generally forbids as much.245 
If private ordering makes it hard for individuals to do things protected from 
government interference—speaking, associating, keeping arms, and so on—that 
is generally no concern of the Constitution. And yet it does stand to reason that 
some private parties who have opened their property to the public or otherwise 
become entangled with the government might thereby lose, at least to some de-
gree, their right not to keep or bear arms. This is, of course, the inevitable im-
 
244. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000). 
245. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
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plication of those (few) cases that have extended equal protection and First 
Amendment rights onto nominally private property.246 
Holding aside the state action exception, however, one might argue that the 
government has no affirmative duty to support arms-bearing or arms-keeping, 
but that it can do so if it so chooses. That is, the discussion here has shown only 
that the right to keep and bear arms may conflict with the right not to. It has not 
demonstrated that the latter should always trump the former. The First 
Amendment analogy is again relevant, since free speech doctrine must often 
grapple with problems involving government efforts to mediate the conflicting 
claims of private speakers. As the Supreme Court explained in Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, “When two people converse face to face, both 
should not speak at once if either is to be clearly understood.”247 Similarly, the 
Court has recognized that “two parades cannot march on the same street simul-
taneously, and government may allow only one.”248 
Extending the analogy to the Second Amendment context, it might be said 
that self-defense interests often come into conflict, and that the government 
must have the power to make one set of self-defense interests yield to another. 
In some situations or contexts, perhaps, the right to bear arms must trump the 
right not to keep them. If, for example, the right to armed self-defense can only 
be effectuated if people are able to bear guns concealed on their person, or in 
others’ private businesses, then courts will have to decide which invocation of 
the right should prevail: those of gun-bearers, or those of homeowners wishing 
to avoid them. The answer to this question is not obvious, but there is good rea-
son to think that in some contexts, one person’s right not to “keep” should 
trump another’s right to “bear.” Heller itself provides strong support for this 
conclusion, by focusing on the importance of self-defense in the home.249 If the 
self-defense right has special scope and power within the home, then it follows 
that the right to keep guns out of the home should be similarly privileged, even 
if that means that other private parties’ ability to take guns where they please is 
limited as a result.  
It is also worth reemphasizing that the right not to keep or bear arms would 
not be any more immune to regulation than its affirmative cousin, and as with 
any constitutional right there are many scenarios in which it might be reasona-
bly and permissibly infringed. Not all infringements of the right not to keep or 
bear are equally invasive, and not all are presumptively unconstitutional. But 
determining which are and which are not almost inevitably requires balancing, 
or otherwise measuring the degree to which the right not to keep or bear has 
been infringed. In Wooley, for example, the Court concluded that “[c]ompelling 
 
246. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Al-
abama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
247. 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969). 
248. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972). 
249. See supra note 6 and sources cited therein. 
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the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement upon 
personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license 
plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree.”250 And of course parties 
can be compelled to give testimony in court, which is itself a form of com-
pelled speech.251 If courts develop a Second Amendment jurisprudence that re-
lies on interest balancing—an approach apparently rejected in Heller252—then 
they may end up weighing the interests of gun owners against those of home-
owners. 
All of this leaves the state in something of a bind. If it passes a “take your 
gun to work” law, it might infringe the Second Amendment rights of people 
who want to protect themselves by not having guns on their property. If it does 
not pass such a law, then it might limit the ability of those who do wish to bear 
arms to carry those arms where they believe they need them. But unattractive as 
the latter result may seem to some, it is not necessarily a constitutional prob-
lem. If private parties wish to ban guns in their homes, on their property, or 
otherwise in their “possession,” the Second Amendment provides no recourse 
for those people who wish to carry guns there. Nor, as I have attempted to show 
here, does it permit the government to intervene on their behalf. This Article, in 
sum, is not an argument for the desirability or constitutionality of gun control. 
Quite to the contrary, it is an argument against certain kinds of government in-
tervention with individuals’ freedom to make decisions about the keeping and 
bearing of arms. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to Heller, it would have been difficult to argue that the Second 
Amendment included the right to keep guns out of one’s home. Such an argu-
ment would have failed for the same reason as a claim that the amendment pro-
tected a right to keep guns in one’s home: the amendment was understood to 
protect state militias, not individual self-defense rights. But by recasting the 
Second Amendment as a guarantee of self-defense, Heller suggests that the 
right not to keep or bear arms does exist for those people—apparently a majori-
ty of Americans—who believe their homes to be safer without guns than with 
them. Of course, that does not mean that the right will be invoked very often, 
because—even including the examples explored in Part III—the government 
rarely forces people to keep or bear arms.  
One other limitation of the Article is worth emphasizing. Though the ar-
gument here builds on analogies to other constitutional provisions, the right not 
to keep or bear arms is wholly internal to the Second Amendment. It draws 
whatever strength it has from the purposes of that amendment alone, and there-
 
250. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
251. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959). 
252. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 631-32 (2008). 
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fore has nothing in particular to say about other arguments against coerced ac-
tivity.253 Most prominent among these, of course, is the current challenge to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,254 which has been described not 
only as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause and taxation powers, but also 
as an infringement of the individual right not to engage in economic activity.255 
The Second Amendment—and therefore this Article—speaks only to the keep-
ing and bearing of arms.  
The logic of Heller indicates that just as the Constitution limits the gov-
ernment’s power to burden citizens’ ability to possess arms, so too should it 
limit the government’s power to burden their ability not to. Laws that make it 
difficult or impossible to keep guns out of one’s possession therefore raise 
Second Amendment problems. This may seem counterintuitive, but analytically 
it is a logical, doctrinal result of the newly constitutionalized right to choose 
whether to defend oneself with arms. 
 
253. I attempt to engage with broader and more conceptual questions in Rights To and 
Not To. See Blocher, supra note 15. 
254. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S. Code), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
255.  See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health In-
surance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 637 (2010) (arguing 
that the Act so tramples on individual rights that it “would truly turn citizens into subjects”). 
